Is There Life After Gilmore’s Death of Contract-Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts by Holmes, Eric M.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 3 March 1980 Article 2
Is There Life After Gilmore’s Death of Contract-
Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good
Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts
Eric M. Holmes
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore’s Death of Contract-Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance
Contracts, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 330 (1980)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol65/iss3/2
IS THERE LIFE AFTER GILMORE'S
DEATH OF CONTRACT?-
INDUCTIONS FROM A STUDY OF
COMMERCIAL GOOD FAITH IN
FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Eric M. Holmest
INTRODUCTION
Something is awry in common-law contracts. The classical
theory of contract' does not reflect reality; it does not comport
with current judicial treatment of contract-malfeasors. For exam-
ple, we still confidently parrot the Restatement of Contracts and
teach that plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages in a contract
action. 2 We cannot, however, plausibly justify this black-letter
tAssociate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Georgia. Member, Georgia Bar.
A.B. 1965, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of North Carolina; LL.M. 1975, Colum-
bia University. This article is the third in a series studying commercial good faith and is
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of the Science of Law
Degree, Faculty of Law, Columbia University. The other two articles are: Holmes, A Model
First-Party Insurance Excess-Liability Act, 14 GA. L. REV. - (1980); Holmes, A Contextual
Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 381 (1978).
The author wishes to thank his J.S.D. chairperson, William F. Young, Jr., for his con-
siderable talents that have lent strength to these articles. A word of appreciation is also due
Dr. Grant Gilmore for his encouragement and seasoned comments on an earlier draft of
this article. The author, of course, is solely accountable for any verbal or legal infelicities.
' Contract theory stems from at least two disparate schools of contract philosophy: (1)
the classical school, designed and promoted by Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, and
characterized by its slogans of volition, freedom of contract, laissez-faire, plain meaning, and
judicial nonintervention; and (2) the realist (or neo-classical) school, fashioned by Corbin
and Llewellyn, with its ideals of good faith and fair dealing, commercial reasonableness,
and conscionability. These two schools are discussed in greater detail in Holmes, Education
for Competent Lawyering-Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 535 (1976).
See also G. GiisoRE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An
Historical Perspective, 54 U. VA. L. REv. 689 (1968). Professor Ian Macneil would add a
third theory: relational contract law. See Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
854 (1978).
1 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). Rather than a flat rejection of all punitive
damages, the Restatement (Second) provides: "Punitive damages are not recoverable for a
breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which puni-
tive damages are recoverable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 369 (Tent. Draft
No. 14, 1979). But for a discussion of the "true" rule, see Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the
Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 220-40
(1977).
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rule except to say that the matter is contract and not tort. Despite
this compelling argument, punitive damages have traditionally
been awarded in many types of contract actions: breach of prom-
ise to marry,3 breach of contract by a common carrier or public
utility, breach of contract when the contractual relationship is of a
fiduciary character, fraudulent breach of contract, and contract
breach accompanied by an independent tort.4  In addition, puni-
tive damages are now frequently awarded for breach of first-party
insurance contracts. 5  A number of courts award a variety of
other damages for contract breach that are also reminiscent of
tort.6
The disintegration of traditional contract damage rules is not
the only blow that time has dealt the classical theory. A change in
societal values and expectations has also undercut most of its for-
mal external rules7 governing contract formation, construction,
and breach. This process began no later than the 1930's with the
advent of the "legal realists."8 Classical theory ostensibly re-
flected the popular attitudes of the late nineteenth century, which
were typified by caveat emptor and laissez-faire. It emphasized prop-
erty rights and took a narrow view of the scope of social duty
3 Because the damages are intensely personal, the type of interest abused is similar to
the interest protected in a tort action. See, e.g., Adams v. Griffith, 51 F. Supp. 549 (W.D.
Mo. 1943); Brown v. Douglas, 104 Ga. App. 769, 122 S.E.2d 747 (1961).
See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 222-40.
s See Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314, 339-46 (1973); notes 241-59 and accompanying text
infra.
A definition of first-party insurance might be helpful. It generally describes that type
of insurance coverage under which the insured or his beneficiary recovers policy benefits
directly from the insurer without establishing fault. The insurer's duty to pay runs directly
to the insured. Life, disability, fire and other property insurance, health and accident, and
title insurance are examples of first-party insurance. It can be contrasted with third-party
(liability) insurance under which the insurer has a duty to defend and to make settlement
for its insured. The award of damages for excess liability is novel in first-party insurance
cases. It is, however, well accepted in third-party insurance cases where the insurer
"wrongfully" (i.e., in bad faith or negligently) mishandles the settlement obligation under
the liability policy. The annotated bibliography in 3 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INSUR-
ANCE LAW - AVOIDING ExcESs LIABILITY (1973), for instance, catalogues a total of 63 law
review articles on third-party excess liability. See generally R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON IN-
SURANCE LAW 510-13 (1971).
6 See notes 96-156 and accompanying text infra.
7 That contract is formal, external and objective is the central thesis of classical theory.
In the words of Holmes, "The whole doctrine of contract is formal & external." This quote
is a handwritten addition by Holmes in his copy of The Common Law. For a reproduction,
see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 230 (Howe ed. 1963).
8 See Holmes, supra note 1, at 554-56.
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implicit in a civil obligation. 9 An example of these tendencies in
classical contract theory is the postulate that a contracting party is
free to choose between performing and paying damages.' 0 To-
day, on the other hand, there is an increasing appreciation of in-
dividual rights, a more restrained appraisal of property rights,
and a broader concept of social duty. Perhaps the best example of
this development is the emerging view that in every contract there
exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" - a
nonconsensual duty prohibiting a party from doing anything that
will injure the right of the other party to receive the benefit of his
bargain. This covenant represents a fundamental policy shift away
from an unbridled freedom from the obligation of contract per-
formance toward the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of
the parties by encouraging performance.
9 See I R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 429-30 (1959); Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commer-
cial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PTT. L. REV. 381, 384-95
(1978).
10 Classical contract theory secured free individual self-assertion and, influenced by Jus-
tice Holmes, recognized no duty to perform any contract obligation. For Holmes, contract
liability should be imposed without regard to moral fault. No moral guilt arises because
man is not significantly different from a baboon or a grain of sand. Since law is divorced
from morals (i.e., amoral), Holmes' bad man theory destroyed any notion of good faith,
fair dealing and cooperation in classical contract law. He explained the classical principle
that one has not only the power but the right to breach his contract:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must
pay damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else. ... If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event
comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the
matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much
ethics into the law as they can.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). In the insurance context,
the classical premise that one can breach so long as he compensates the other party gives
rise to a question: Does the classical theory fairly compensate insureds when insurers
choose to breach? Unfortunately, the answer in many cases is no. See text at notes 33-35
infra.
For a classic explication of the freedom from the obligation to perform, see F. KESSLER
& G. GILMORE, Contract as a Principle of Order, in CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-15
(2d ed. 1970).
11 "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1970). Section 231 has no predecessor in the original Restatement, probably
because an affirmative obligation of "good faith" was antithetical to classical contract law.
Sections 1-201(19), 2-103(b), and 2-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code also recognize
the good-faith duty.
The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing illustrates the sweeping difference
between modern and classical contract theories. The classical theory envisioned contractual
relationships similar to the law school experience-hard to get into, hard to flunk out of
and not particularly harmful. Modern theory, on the other hand, allows easier access and
egress, but exposes you to greater harm (liability) while you are there.
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Such deviations from classical theory prompted Professor
Gilmore to declare respectfully that contract is dead. 12  His
graveyard theory is premised on the recent expansion of promis-
sory liability and on more flexible damage awards. Classical con-
tract theory narrows the range of liability with its bargained-for-
exchange formula'3 and compensates solely for damage to the
expectation interest. Modern realist contract theories, on the other
hand, have enlarged contractual obligations with promissory es-
toppel, moral obligation, unjust enrichment, culpa in contrahendo'4
and good-faith duties. Awards of consequential damages, punitive
damages, and the once extraordinary remedy of specific perfor-
mance are becoming commonplace. Offsetting the additional ex-
posure these innovations permit, courts have initiated a parallel
expansion of contractual excuses' 5 and of policing devices' 6 to en-
sure fairness in contract performance and discharge. Neverthe-
less, the net effect of these twentieth century developments, which
might be characterized as the socialization of contract law, has
been an explosion of liability. From these developments, Professor
Gilmore concludes that contract is dissolving into the mainstream
of tort law from which contract principles emerged over a century
ago.' 7
Certainly something has changed, but contract is not dead
and tort has not absorbed it. The reverse is a more accurate de-
scription of the theoretical trend. Tort is moving away from fault
12 G. GiLMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). The reviews of this book demonstrate
that the academic community took the "dodo and unicorn" theory seriously. See, e.g.,
Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 452 (1975); Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L.
REv. 1216; Mooney, Book Review, 55 ORE. L. REv. 155 (1976); Reitz, Book Review, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 697 (1975); Speidel, Book Review, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1975). See also
Milhollin, More on the Death of Contract, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 29 (1974).
13 The requirement of a bargain was the sole pervasive justification for contract
enforcement. The requirement of consideration may appear to be an independent justifi-
cation, but not just any benefit or detriment incurred by a party would support the enforce-
ment of a promise. The classicists insist that there be a cause and effect relationship
between the detriment and the promise which defines the bargain. According to Holmes, the
"root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for
the other, between consideration and promise." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 230.
14 For a discussion of this continental precontractual duty of care see Kessler & Fine,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964).
15 New contractual excuses include mistake, commercial impracticability, and frustra-
tion.
1; Reasonableness, conscionability, and good faith are among the recently recognized
policing devices.
17 G. GILIORE, supra note 12, at 100-01.
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as the sole basis for liability and toward compensation systems;
strict liability and worker's compensation are examples of this
movement. Contract law has begun to move into the resulting
vacuum by relying on fault as an element of liability in an increas-
ing variety of situations. Two equitable concepts, unconscionability
and good faith, have been the most important instruments of this
process. Unconscionability permits the courts to expunge mate-
rially offensive terms from written contracts. Good faith allows the
implication of duties for which the parties neglected to provide.
Judicial use of these tools does not signal the death of a con-
sensual contract theory. It merely recognizes the limits of such a
theory, which the classicists ignored. By according equal freedom
of contract to parties with unequal sophistication, knowledge, and
economic power, the classical theorists invited inequitable results.
As Professor Kessler suggested, freedom of contract is the cloak
under which business enterprises can legislate in an authoritarian
manner. 18  Liberty of economic activity is a legitimate policy
which the law must accommodate. Courts cannot, however, allow
it to dominate the law and reduce contractual relations to a primi-
tive battle for survival of the fittest. Public law as well as private
assent structures private relations; contract law must sometimes
look beyond assent if it is to regulate a marketplace dominated by
boilerplate. Classical theorists also invited unfairness with their as-
sertion that a person was free to perform, or breach and pay
compensatory damages. As Professor Farnsworth concluded in his
study of contract remedies: "All in all, our system of legal rem-
edies for breach of contract, heavily influenced by the economic
philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked solicitude for
men who do not keep their promises." 19
18 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629, 631-33 (1943).
11 Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1216
(1970). This tendency is related to the traditional limits of the remedy of specific perform-
ance. By the seventeenth century, specific performance had become an extraordinary
remedy available only when monetary relief at law was deemed inadequate. Because courts
treated land as unique, most suits for specific performance concerned land contracts. The
extraordinary nature of specific performance probably springs from Coke's pronounce-
ment in Bromage v. Genning, I Rolle 368, 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1616). According to
Coke, a promisor should be permitted to refuse to do whatever he promised to do, even
when performance is possible and desired by the promisee, and simply pay damages for
any loss suffered by the promisee. Classical contract theorists embraced Coke's philosophy.
Not only did Holmes, for example, approve of Bromage v. Genning in his famous address
The Path of the Law, but from it he deduced the right of every promisor to breach his
contract and pay compensatory damages. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 462.
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As this Article will discuss, courts now blend equity, contract
and tort principles in requiring parties to exhibit good faith and
fair conduct in the performance and discharge of contract duties.
Although it is difficult to squeeze this judicial use of separate legal
areas into one proper legal classification, this overlap might be
labelled "conequitort." Specifically, this Article will undertake to
demonstrate, by a close examination of first-party insurance con-
tract cases, 20 that courts are recognizing three varieties of contract
breach. The first is the traditional simple breach of contract for
which damages are based on the expectation interest. Fault and
blame are irrelevant. The law in this area accords with the classi-
cal ideas of strict liability and limited damages for breach: courts
do not consider noncompensatory and punitive damages. The
second is bad-faith breach of contract for which not only compensa-
tory but all nonpunitive damages proximately caused by the breach
are recoverable, including attorney's fees, all economic losses, and
mental distress. The third is fraudulent or oppressive breach of con-
tract for which punitive damages are allowed.
The recognition of these three types of contract breach dem-
onstrates that modern contract law is concerned with substantive
and procedural justice in contract matters. The equitable notions
of good faith and fair dealing have breathed a fresh and salutary
honesty into what the classicists considered a bare contractual rela-
tionship. This evolving contract law recognizes a positive duty that
promotes the policy articulated by Dean Roscoe Pound: "In
civilized society men must be able to assume that those with whom
they deal in the general intercourse of society will act in good
faith." 21
0 For a discussion of the relevance of insurance law to general contract law, as well as
an explication of the ideas from insurance law which suggest the future for general con-
tract law, see Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in
Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 381, 395-99 (1978). Most modern contracts do not
mirror the classical model of bargained-for terms. The theory premises that parties bargain
and assent to terms that are legally given the status of private law. The only task for courts
is to separate expressions of assent that are legally operative from those that are outside
the parties' assent. Many courts perform this task by applying a bound-by-what-you-sign
rule. According to such a rule, when parties sign a form or pad contract everything in the
writing is held to be within the parties' assent. See note 53 infra. In the insurance context,
however, courts are beginning to evaluate the reality of presumed assent. In that inquiry,
courts attempt to avoid contractual overreaching and unconscionable advantage, honor
reasonable expectations, and promote good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, to the extent
that modern contracts are created by adhesion rather than bargaining, insurance has im-
portant implications for the future of contract law.
21 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1959).
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I
SIMPLE BREACH OF CONTRACT
A. Classical Contract Damage Limitations
Contract law seeks principally to protect the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties by granting them the benefit of their
bargain. The benefit-of-the-bargain rule seeks to protect the ex-
pectation interest by placing an aggrieved party in the same
economic position he would be in if the other party faithfully per-
formed the contract.22 In the insurance context, courts generally
classify an insurer's refusal to pay legitimate policy claims as a
simple breach of contract. In accordance with the classical view of
the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, courts traditionally awarded the
insured only the amount due under the policy plus legal interest
for simple breach.23  Since the insured's expectation is to receive
the stated sum of the policy, the payment of that amount plus
interest for delay supposedly puts him in the position he would
have been in had the contract been properly performed.
In addition to this recovery, classical theory permitted "spe-
cial" or "consequential" damages, subject to limitations. 24  Except
for the requirement of causation, the barriers to recovery of con-
sequential damages all spring from the rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale.25 Hadley allows only consequential damages "such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result
of the breach of it." 26 Thus when a first-party insurer wrong-
22 In addition to the expectation interest, the reliance and restitutionary interests have
strong claims for protection. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). Compare RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTmc'rs §§ 89D, 90 (Tent.
Drafts No. 1-7 1973). For a discussion of the requirement of a bargain in relation to stan-
dardized contracts like an insurance policy, see Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the
Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REv. 1 (1972).
23 This limited recovery is the general rule. See 16 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEmAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 8881, at 633-38 (1968). See, e.g., Felder v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966); Mitchell v. Intermountain Cas. Co., 69 N.M. 150, 364
P.2d 856 (1961). Nonetheless, courts now recognize a broader theory of recovery, as dis-
cussed below. See note 96 and accompanying text infra.
24 For a more considered discussion of these limitations, see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 14-4 to -10 (2d ed. 1977); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF REMEDIES § 12.3 (1973); J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS §§ 224-226 (2d rev. ed.
1974).
25 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep 145 (1854). The Hadley rule was reformulated in Victoria
Laundry (Windsor), Ltd. v. Newman Indus., Ltd. 2 K.B. 528, 1 All E.R. 997 (1949) which
expands the application of the rule to allow consequential damages in a wider variety of
situations. See D. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 812-14.
26 9 Exch. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
336 [Vol. 65:330
1980] COMMERCIAL GOOD FAITH 337
fully fails to pay benefits, the insured may recover more than the
amount due under the policy plus interest if a reasonable person
in the insurer's position with its knowledge could have reasonably
foreseen the additional damage. 27  Note that foreseeability, 28 not
causation, is the major obstacle to recovering consequential dam-
ages.
The Hadley rule can justify consequential damages in suits on
first-party insurance contracts.29 It seems reasonably foreseeable
27 The extent of recovery is not measured by what the insurer actually foresaw. Instead
the objective test of what a reasonable person with particular knowledge should have fore-
seen applies. One issue is how much knowledge of the special circumstances the breaching
party must have. The classical theorists wanted to limit recoveries by requiring that the
defaulting party have tactitly consented to assume liability for the damages claimed.
Holmes espoused this test: "The extent of liability in such cases is likely to be within [the
insurer's] contemplation, and whether it is or not, should be worked out on terms which it
fairly may be presumed he would have assented to if they had been presented to his
mind." Globe Ref. Co. v. Landra Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903). Although the
tacit-agreement test has fallen into disrepute, the insurance rule limiting damages to the
policy amount plus interest is arguably a special application of this test.
28 Foreseeability, like good faith, is an elastic concept which turns on the presumed as
well as actual knowledge of the insurance company. This differs from case to case. The
foreseeability test calls for a refined analysis of risk allocation. As Professor Murray
suggests, courts applying the Hadley test must ask:
Would a reasonable man in the position of the defaulting promisor who knew
of the special circumstances at the time the contract was formed normally as-
sume the risk of liability for the special consequences of his breach in light of
all the surrounding circumstances and particularly, the consideration he was to
receive for performance?
J. MURRAY, supra note 24, at 456. Such direct consideration of risk allocation would foster
clarity and precision as well as fairness.
29 See, e.g., Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (applying
Alaska law). The court held the insured could recover lost rents in a fire insurance suit.
Even mental-distress damages should be recoverable in first-party insurance cases under
the Hadley rule. This assertion runs counter to conventional wisdom. Courts generally do
not award mental distress damages for contract breach unless the defendant had reason to
know that the breach would cause mental suffering beyond that occasioned by mere
pecuniary loss. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932). An insurance contract is
usually considered commercial and not personal in nature and thus it does not fall into
that special class of contracts directly concerned with the nonbreaching party's emotional
well-being. Since an insured seeks only a monetary benefit, any mental suffering caused by
monetary loss is per se unforeseeable. Id. See, e.g., Cassady v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 370
F. Supp. 388, 398 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Pendleton v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 425,
432 (E.D. La. 1970); Dawkins v. National Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800, 802
(D.S.C. 1966). But, as suggested below, economic and emotional security are intertwined in
the insurance obligation. See note 34 and accompanying text infra. Although mental-
distress damages ought to be recoverable pursuant to the Hadey rule, there is a paucity of
authority that supports this view. One case that does is Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d
425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), in which the court held that an insurance
contract is not commercial but personal in nature. The court then applied the foreseeabil-
ity concept to allow recovery of mental distress damages. Cf Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins.
Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by
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that a disabled insured will incur additional economic losses if he
is not promptly paid his disability benefits. Similarly, where the
owner of a mortgaged business suffers a material fire loss, it
seems reasonably foreseeable that if the insurer does not pay for
the covered losses promptly, the businessman may be financially
pinched and even bankrupted. 30
This application of Hadley, however, has encountered judicial
resistance; many courts have held that all damages beyond the
stated policy amount are outside the contemplation of the parties
as a matter of law. 31  This rule, which limits plaintiff's damages to
the policy amount plus the legal rate of interest, has three justifi-
cations: (1) it is simple, precise, and predictable; (2) the plaintiff
can borrow money at or near the legal rate of interest and thus he
cannot lose anything that the policy amount plus interest will not
restore to him; and (3) an insurance contract is a commercial con-
tract and parties may bargain for a provision designating specifi-
cally who will bear the risk of consequential losses.3 2
Insurers: Recent Development in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1311
(1973).
" See, e.g., Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967)
(en banc). There, the insured's heavily mortgaged motel was destroyed by fire. Following
the insurer's unjustified denial of policy benefits, the insured could not meet his mortgage
payments and went bankrupt. Although the carrier argued for the per se unforeseeable
rule as to the consequential losses, the court held that, because plaintiff's bankruptcy was
foreseeable, the carrier was liable for all consequential losses proximately flowing from the
breach.
Where the owner of a heavily mortgaged ... business property suffers a sub-
stantial fire loss, the owner ... may be in jeopardy of losing his property and
becoming a bankrupt. A major, if not the main, reason why a businessman
purchases fire insurance is to guard against such eventualities.... Insurers are,
of course, chargeable with knowledge of the basic reasons why fire insurance is
purchased, and of the likelihood that an improper delay in payment may result
in the very injuries for which the insured sought protection by purchasing the
policies.
428 P.2d at 864, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
The Reichert decision was vacated upon rehearing because the plaintiff's original claim
for relief vested in the bankruptcy trustee. 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321
(1968) (en banc). Nonetheless, Judge Peters, author of the original opinion, vigorously
maintained that the plaintiff was entitled to consequential damages. Id. at 839, 442 P.2d at
386, 69 Cal Rptr. at 330. See Parks, Recover of Extra-Contract Damages in Suits on Insurance
Policies, 9 FORUm 43, 58 (1973).
3' See Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973); Note, Extra-Contractual Damages in Suits on Insur-
ance Policies, 46 U. CiN. L. REV. 170 (1977); Note, First Party Torts-Extra-Contractual Liabil-
ity of Insurers Who Violate the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 900
(1976); Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party In-
surance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164 (1976).
"2 See Note, supra note 31, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. at 169.
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.Although this rule of per se unforeseeability is undeniably
simple and certain, its rationale does not stand scrutiny, even
given classical contract jurisprudence. False assumptions underlie
the second and third justifications. It is not necessarily true that
an insured can secure a loan pending judicial determination of
the insurer's legal obligation. Lenders may consider the insured a
bad risk. Even if the insured can borrow money he may be forced
to pay much more than the legal rate of interest. In times of dou-
ble digit inflation, the commercial rate may be as much as twice
the legal rate of interest.33 Thus the policy-amount-plus-interest
formula will provide inadequate compensation for the insured.
The argument that an insured can bargain for a provision
that gives the insurer a duty to pay consequential damages also
fails to reflect market reality. An insured does not buy an insur-
ance contract based on an arm's length bargain. Instead he buys
protection for himself and his family. In this context the insured
reasonably expects protection in the form of prompt payment for
the covered contingencies. Insurers are well aware of this expecta-
tion, as the slogan "you are in good hands with Allstate" attests.
Even Samuel Williston, a principal designer of the classical con-
tract theory, notes:
The final and perhaps most significant characteristic of insur-
ance contracts, differentiating them from ordinary, negotiated
commercial contracts, is the increasing tendency of the public to
look upon the insurance policy not as a contract but as a special
form of chattel. The typical applicant buys "protection" much
as he buys groceries. 34
Courts that deny all consequential damages encourage insur-
ers to breach rather than perform. The insurer saves money by
trying to force each first-party insured to settle.35 It may pay
" Legal rates of interest vary among the several states from 5% to 7%. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 57-101 (1975) (7%); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5004 (McKinney Supp. 1976)
(6%). Commercial rates also vary; in January of 1980 the prime rate of interest was hover-
ing around.15%. See Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
34 7 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTs 34 (3d ed. 1957). Courts are beginning to
view an insurance contract more as a commodity than a contract. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970). For a judicial discussion and application of the implied warranty
of fitness from the UCC to an insurance "good," see C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins.
Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169, 177-79 (Iowa 1975).
35 If the insurance company refuses to pay its insured in full, then the insured is al-
most always better off, considering transaction costs in collecting the full amount, accepting
some lesser amount. This is explained and statistically verified in Leff, Injury, Ignorance and
Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L. J. 1 (1970) along with other aspects of
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nothing or a settlement figure below the policy amount. At worst,
if settlement fails and the insurer is held in breach, it only has to
pay the face amount plus legal interest. Moreover, even if the in-
surer loses the case, if its return on investments approximates the
commercial rate of interest, it will earn at least the difference be-
tween the commercial rate and the legal rate while litigation drags
on.
Thus, recovery of both compensatory and, in the better view,
consequential damages for simple breach of first-party insurance
contracts comports with classical contract theory.36 Nevertheless,
not all courts that have awarded such damages for wrongful de-
nial of first-party insurance benefits, particularly outside the sim-
ple breach situation, have relied on Hadlev. Instead, they have ex-
panded contract itself to reflect the economic, social, and legal
realities of the insurer-insured relationship. This process illus-
trates the changes that have revolutionized contract law generally.
But before examining the history and theoretical framework of
this process, it may be useful to examine the forces that set it in
motion.
contract law that encourage non-performance. The face-amount-of-the-policy-plus-interest
rule foments unethical conduct:
In cases involving disability and health policies, certain insurance com-
panies have left insureds and their families destitute and have engaged in
malicious and outrageous conduct for the purpose of avoiding meritorious
claims. These companies have subjected disabled insureds to unnecessary and
burdensome medical examinations, have fraudulently attempted to induce in-
sureds into waiving their rights under their policies, and have verbally abused
insureds, going so far as to fabricate accusations of fraud. "[U]nless prevented
by the courts, it is to the interest of a disability insurer to engage in protracted
and unwarranted litigation creating undue stress which may well precipitate the
insured's death."
In the area of fire insurance, the companies have subjected their insureds
to costly and time-consuming examinations for the sole purpose of delaying
payment. They have initiated allegedly unfounded prosecutions for arson and
fraud. By wrongfully delaying desperately needed funds, insurers have forced
businesses into bankruptcy.
Other examples of unethical conduct have occurred in cases involving life
and accident insurance.
Note, supra note 31, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. at 165-66 (footnotes omitted).
'6 For an excellent single work which demonstrates both the inadequacies of these
policy bases and the development of excess-liability in the first-party context, see J. MCCAR-
THY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES 1-94 (2d ed. 1978).
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B. Impetus to Expansion
Prior to 1870, when Christopher Columbus Langdell em-
barked to discover the first casebook for law-school teaching,3 7
there was no general theory of contract. Our legal ancestors saw
debt, covenant, account, and assumpsit as distinct, self-contained
areas for legal inquiry and reasoning. They did not attempt to
find doctrinal bridges or unifying principles. 38  Langdell's case
system gave the law a theory of contract. He argued that law is an
inductive science, that the library is its laboratory, and that the case
method of teaching extracts fundamental principles from the raw
material of printed decisions in the logical manner of the physical
sciences. 39 For Langdell, the law of contract was the fundamental,
archetypical branch of "legal science" and he. awarded it the
honor of the first casebook. In compiling his contracts casebook,
he discovered a theory of contract which still dominates our think-
ing today.
Before Langdell, common-law theory assumed that all deci-
sions of all higher courts could be reconciled "on principle" and
that all were equally authoritative. Because of the enormous pro-
liferation of decisions, however, many of which contained con-
fused, obsolete, or simply bad law, opinions became increasingly
inconsistent. 40  Nevertheless, theory dictated that courts decide
new cases on their factual congruity with previous decisions, not
37 Langdell popularized case study instruction, now almost the exclusive method of
legal education, by writing what is generally regarded as the first American casebook. C.
LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871). Sticklers for detail may,
however, challenge the originality of Langdell's concept. Judge Zephaniah Swift published
a book in 1810 which consisted of a short 174-page treatise on evidence with an appendix
of 68 pages containing the principal cases referred to in the text. See Baldwin, Education for
the Bar in the United States, 4 Am. L. SCH. REV. 8, 13 (1915). According to Professor Warren,
Angell's A Treatise on the Common Law in Relation to Watercourses, published in 1824, was
the first American casebook. See C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 541 (1911).
3S F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 96 (2d ed. 1970). Because there was no gen-
eral common law theory of contracts, many early legal scholars turned to Roman law for
rational and scientific analysis. Roman law, however, recognized only specific types of con-
tracts and did not itself succeed in developing a theory of contract. Id. at 96 n.3.
39 In pithy language Langdell states these basic premises in his first contracts casebook.
C. LANGDELL, supra note 37, at vi. Sixteen years later, as Dean of the Harvard Law School,
Langdell restated these fundamental premises. Langdell, Address at the 250th Anniversary of
Harvard College, 3 L.Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887), quoted in 2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 374 (1908).
40 See A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 375 (1921). For
illustrations of the "hopeless contrariety of decisi6ns" due to "simple logical fallacies," see
Drake, The Rule of Law and the Legal Right, 19 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1921).
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on their merits. Lawyers sought cases that were "on all fours" and
frequently concealed logical inconsistencies by stressing the letter
rather than the spirit of a case. As more cases were decided, the
likelihood of finding a case on point increased. Courts soon
sought the narrow precedent instead of the appropriately
reasoned principle. The factual case governed the law whether or
not it comported with sound legal principles. Langdell's scientific
theory halted this trend. Rather than granting equal respect to all
cases, Langdell discarded the vast majority as useless and critically
selected cases that embodied the basic doctrines of common-law
contracts. From these the legal scientist was to divine, by induc-
tion, the fundamental principles of contract law. In theory, the
accurate statement of these first principles would describe a ra-
tional, harmonious system.41
The Langdellian conceptualization dominated contract theory
for over eighty years. 42  Treatise writers, striving "to place the law
on a more philosophic and satisfactory basis," 43 did weave con-
tract law into a set of scientific principles stated in an orderly
manner. Samuel Williston's treatise, with its ingenious technical
refinements to Langdell's conceptual framework, gave contract its
definitive form for some decades. These writers transformed the
living law of contracts "into a fabric of black-letter rules-a kind
of unwritten and sluggishly evolutionary civil code." 44 The
American Law Institute (ALI) carried this approach to its logical
extreme. By 1920 it had set out to induce the immutable45 first
principles of contract from case law and grandly synthesize them
in a black-letter text.46
41 Langdell's case system gave the law of contract a harmonious, unified theoretical
system. It was easy to accept the sanctity of pure contract principles, because within any
inflexible and doctrinal system there is a self-confirming logic and a seductive symmetry.
Contract law came to be judged by its logical symmetry, of which Langdell was the master.
For an illustration of the master's touch, see C. LANGDELL, A Summary of the Law of Con-
tracts, in CASES ON CONTRACTS 89 (2d ed. 1880). Langdell taught contract law as a negative,
impersonal and bloodless abstraction, frozen into what Professor Page in 1905 called a
"rational and harmonious system." I W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 19 (1905).
42 Langdell's method of analysis, of course, is still pre-eminent.
13 C. ASHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (1911).
44 L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 211 (1965).
45 Obviously the first restaters knew there would be more cases. Apparently they
thought that periodic collections of new cases annotated to the relevant principles and rules
would keep the Restatements current. Such collections were published in a series of vol-
umes entitled The Restatements in the Courts. See generally H. GOODRICH & P. WOLKIN, THE
STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1923-1961 (1961).
46 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Introduction, at xi (1932).
342 [Vol. 65:330
COMMERCIAL GOOD FAITH
Yet, by 1952, the ALI had decided that the original Re-
statements needed restatement; the original restaters' assumption
that there was one everlasting system of contract law was
unfounded.4 7 Even Williston candidly admitted, as early as the
preface to the first edition of his treatise, that there is no single
doctrinal unity in contract law: "The law of contracts ... after
starting with some degree of unity now tends from its very size to
fall apart.... It therefore seems desirable to treat the subject of
contracts as a whole, and show the wide range of application of its
principles." 48 Nevertheless, the classicists' attempt to impose an
artificial unity on contract theory at best impaired independent
analysis of transactional differences among contracts and at worst
was misleading.
C. The Laws of Contracts
Today, this unified conceptualization of contract is dead -
not contract itself, as Professor Gilmore contends. Out of its ashes
has arisen a jurisprudence of process, in which law is perceived as
responsively adapting to meet the exigencies of changing social
conditions. 49  The science of law has become the science of ad-
ministration of law.50 One result of this rethinking has been the
burgeoning of new laws of contracts which focus on three distinct
aspects: (1) the formational process, (2) the status and relationship
of the contracting parties, and (3) special considerations generated
by the nature of the underlying transaction. More simply put,
47 In his introduction to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, Professor
Wechsler underscored this change of emphasis:
The essence of that change has been the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid
rules in favor of standards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judg-
ment to important values that were formerly ignored. Such a transformation in
the corpus of the law reduces certitude as well as certainty, posing a special
problem in the process of restatement.... [This second Restatement] presents a
striking contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma was so thoroughly
enshrined.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introduction, at vii (1971).
4' 1. S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS xi (3d ed. 1957).
9 See, e.g., Rosenberg, The New Looks in Law, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 539 (1969).
5' The common area of agreement shared by this essentially eclectic group is perhaps
best expressed by the venerable Leon Green:
"[Law" as here conceived is the power of passing judgment... through formal
political agencies for securing social control.... [Any science of law is at bot-
tom, the science of the administration of law.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1015-16 (1928) (foot-
note omitted).
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courts are grappling with three questions: How was the contract
formed? Who are the parties? What kind of contract is it?
1. Formational Process-Bargain or Adhesion Model?
Classical contract theorists premised only one transactional
model for contracts, a bargained-for exchange. Drawing upon the
classical principles of freedom of contract, volition and mutual as-
sent, they assumed that all contracts result from the interaction of
parties who meet one another in the marketplace on relatively
equal economic terms. Each individual pursues his own interests
through arm's length bargaining, and the race is to the swiftest.
To protect the fruits that industrious businesspeople acquire
through competition, the classical theory condemns official inter-
vention in private transactions and praises government when it
governs least.5 ' Also, since it is a fundamental principle of classi-
cal contract theory that the objective manifestation of mutual as-
sent controls the terms of the contract,52 courts often bind both
parties to the letter of what they sign. 53
This approaGh is reasonable if parties to a contract actually
dicker over material terms so that both parties not only read but
comprehend the terms. No doubt some contracts issue from bar-
gaining, choice, and free will- but not many. Most contracts in-
volve only minimal bargaining over the most elementary terms. A
mass standardized contract fitting the adhesion, not the bargain
model of contracts, is typical today. Llewellyn powerfully argued
5, For a discussion of compulsion and restraint in relation to classical contract law, see
W. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 92-94 (1959) (English law); Patterson, Compul-
sory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 731 (1943) (American law).
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1973). Ever since courts translated the
need for a "meeting of the minds" into a requirement of manifestation of mutual assent,
contract law has been concerned with the objective rather than the subjective state of a
party's mind. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 22-25 (2d ed. 1977); I
S. WILLISTON, supra note 48, at 34-37.
51 Many courts presume that everything in the written contract is within the ambit of
the parties' assent and therefore conclude that the writing is the entire agreement. To
reach this presumption of assent, however, a court must conclude that all parties: (1) have
a duty to read the contract which in most cases is standardized; (2) can find all material
terms in the contract; (3) have the capacity to comprehend all material terms; and (4) have
an opportunity to bargain over the material terms of the agreement. The bound-by-what-
you-sign rule is based on these four presuppositions; if a court finds that all four are
present in a given case, then it can fairly conclude that the parties have assented to all
material terms in the written contract. For a critical evaluation of the bound-by-what-you-
sign rule, see Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the Eviden-
tiary Condition, 12 GA. L. REv. 783, 789-804 (1978).
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that a party who is proffered a form contract genuinely assents
only to the few dickered terms and gives blanket assent to
boilerplate terms that do not cause unfair surprise or unreason-
ably limit the dickered terms.54
There is nothing inherently wrong with mass standardized
contracts. The pad or form contract serves several useful pur-
poses. It is easier to find one attorney who can skillfully draft a
technical form for a million contracts than to find a million who
can each draft one satisfactory contract. Standardization also saves
time and money. Insurance companies, for example, seek to
achieve several goals through standardization: (1) economy in
marketing; (2) control over soliciting agents; and (3) assurance of
uniform judicial decisions.55 On the other hand, standardization
eliminates arm's length bargaining and limits freedom of choice in
contracting. The adhering party has little or no opportunity to
bargain over boilerplate terms and no reasonable opportunity to
secure the contracted expectation elsewhere. The essence of as-
sent- volition -is not present. Consequently, courts are now tak-
ing cognizance of the degree of genuine assent to standardized
forms in formulating contract rules.
The insurance contract is the classic example of the adhesion
model; 56 its fate may suggest the future of the law for standar-
dized contracts generally. Insurance contracts are adhesive for
several reasons: the inequality of bargaining'power and knowledge
between carrier and policyholder, 57 the technical character of pol-
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about 'assent' to boiler-plate
clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent
at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That
one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasona-
ble or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which
has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of
those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expression
of agreement....
The queer thing is that where the transaction occurs without the fine print
present, courts do not find this general line of approach too hard to under-
stand....
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 237, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
5 For an excellent explication of the process of standardization, see R. KEETON, BASIC
TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 68-87 (1971).
56 Patterson's classic article on life insurance introduced the phrase "contract of adhe-
sion" into the legal vocabulary. Patterson, The Deliver, of a Life Insurance Polig, 33 HARV. L.
REV. 198, 222 (1919).
" This factor is actually a combination of other subordinate factors: the aleatory nature
of insurance which results in an inequity of values exchanged, the unintelligible form and
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icy terms,58 the tendency to deliver the policy after contract for-
mation and premium payment,59 and their mass-standardized na-
ture.
Courts in the 1920's and 1930's paid lip service to the classical
theory of contracts but manipulated classical rules to achieve just
results. They frequently used construction as a covert tool,60 by
holding clear language to be ambiguous, instead of admitting to
changing the contract so that substantially oppressive terms were
denied enforcement. Professor Kessler criticized this practice:
[C]ourts have made great efforts to protect the weaker contract-
ing party and still keep "the elementary rules" of the law of
contracts intact. As a result, our common law of standardized
contracts is highly contradictory and confusing, and the poten-
tialities inherent in the common law system for coping with
contracts of adhesion have not been fully developed.6 1
Recently, however, courts have distinguished the adhesion
contract from the classical bargained-for-exchange contract and
have created rights at variance with the express terms of a stan-
dardized contract. Professor Robert Keeton has identified three
policies supporting such judicial regulation and rewriting of pol-
icy terms in the insurance context: (1) An insurer should not be
permitted an unconscionable advantage in an insurance transac-
tion; (2) the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
diction of insurance contracts, and the mass-produced take-it-or-leave-it policy. See generally
E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF THE INSURANCE LAw 2-3 (1957).
58 Former Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Herbert S. Denenberg, using a
readability scale ranging up to 100, found that the Bible scores 67 in readability, Einstein's
relativity theory scores 18, and various insurance contracts score from 10 to minus 2.
O'Connell, Living with Life Insurance, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. One
court, deploring the wilderness of built-up conditions as a Tower of Babel, decried the
technical, uncertain language of insurance contracts: "We reiterate our plea for clarity and
simplicity in policies that fulfill so important a public service." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Electric Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 691-92, 433 P.2d 174, 182, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390
(1967). One response has been an antijargon law which permits "simplified" policies to
contain language inconsistent with provisions required by insurance legislation. See, e.g.,
N.Y. INS. LAW § 168-b (McKinney Supp. 1974).
5' See Patterson, supra note 56.
60 The term contra proferentem succinctly expresses the "familiar principle that insurance
policies be strictly construed against the insurer, and that ambiguities and doubts and
equivocal words be construed against the insurer and be resolved in the insured's favor."
Mohan v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 38 Pa. D.&C.2d 401, 410 (1965), affd per curiam
mem., 207 Pa. Super. Ct. 205, 216 A.2d 342 (1966). This principle masked many depar-
tures from orthodox contract theory.
6' Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 629, 633 (1943).
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intended beneficiaries should be honored; and, (3) an insured's
detrimental reliance upon the insurer's assurances should be red-
ressed. 62 Courts are increasingly recognizing that an insured has
virtually no opportunity to bargain over who should bear the risk
of consequential damages. 63  These courts, in taking account of
the special nature of adhesion contracts, are recognizing an im-
portant new principle for contract law6 4 and repudiating classical
theory.
2. Status and Contractual Relationship
According to classical theory, parties in arm's length bargain-
ing seek some commercial advantage through the legal device of
contract. Since this relationship is inherently antagonistic, the par-
ties do not expect good faith and fair dealing; they define their
duties only by their consent. This approach ignores the status and
relationship of the parties except to acknowledge that a contrac-
tual relation exists. This model is not universally invalid, but it is
not universally applicable either. Recognizing this, a number of
courts have considered the status and relationship of the parties
as a basis for awarding consequential and punitive damages. "
For example, when a real estate broker breached his contract
Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger allowed punitive damages be-
cause of the parties' contractual relationship, stating:
[O]nce it has been shown that one trained and experienced
holds himself out to the public as worthy to be trusted for hire
... and those so invited do place their trust and confidence,
and that trust is intentionally and consciously disregarded, and
exploited for unwarranted gain, community protection, as well
as that of the victim, warrants the imposition of punitive dam-
ages. 66
One might argue that this is a fiduciary duty, not a contrac-
tual duty. The relationship which creates the duty is, however,
62 The process of identifying the principles for purposive interpretation of insurance
contracts was initially accomplished in Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1281 (1970).
" See note 96 and accompanying text infra.
64 In the formation, performance and discharge of insurance contracts, both insurer
and insured must have exhibited good-faith conduct according to reasonable standards set
by customary practices and by individual expectations. Holmes, supra note 9, at 400.
65 See cases collected in Annot. 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973); Note, The New Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605,
613-16 (1978); 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 685, 704-06 (1977).
66 Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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contractual: without the contract, there would be no special rela-
tionship of trust and "fiduciary" duty. As Professor Sullivan has
explained, "It is disingenuous to treat cases which present breach
of fiduciary duty in the contractual context as wholly distinct from
ordinary contract actions." Words and phrases like "fiduciary,"
"relations of trust," and "confidential" describe contractual rela-
tionships requiring implicit duties of good faith and fair dealing.
Although these duties are equitable in nature, they are nonethe-
less contract-based.
In theory societies progress from a law of status to a law of
contract.68 American contract law may, however, be witnessing a
partial reversal as courts acknowledge different rules of conduct
based on the status and relationship of parties to a contract. A
merchant may have to meet a higher standard of knowledge and
care than a consumer in identical transactions.6 9  Similarly, a
buyer generally has to meet a lower standard of disclosure than a
seller.70  The degree of sophistication parties possess concerning
the object of the contract is another status criterion which may
help determine the applicable rules. When one party has more
intelligence, expertise, and experience than the other, their rela-
tionship may create obligations and expectations different from
those in the ordinary contract. If, because of his status, a contract-
ing party does not have the sophistication to discover relevant
facts, he may have to rely on the other party's disclosure. If the
other party knows of this reliance and of the expectation of dis-
closure, the court may recognize a duty to satisfy any justifiable
reliance. 7 1
The ethical ideal of conscientiousness and good faith led
equity courts to develop substantive as well as remedial rules.
Some of these equitable principles have grown into complex, dis-
crete bodies of doctrine- trust law, mortgage law, and securities
67 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 299.
68 See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 18-35.
69 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312, -314.
70 This general rule is forcefully criticized in Keeton, Fraud - Concealment and Non-
disclosure, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 21-27 (1936).
71 See Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Ms.
Vokes, a widow, was induced to purchase over $31,000 worth of dancing lessons by defen-
dant's false praise regarding the development of her dancing skills. Since she was not in a
position to appraise her dancing advancement knowledgeably, the court held that the de-
fendant had a duty to disclose her true dance potential before she contracted for addi-
tional instruction. For an example of full disclosure requirements based on an inequality of
knowledge during the performance stage of an insurance contract, see Bowler v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969).
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law, for example. Others, such as equitable conversion, equitable
estoppel, and laches, continue to be principles of wide-ranging but
sporadic applicability. Equity often provides the raw material for
the formulation of new legal duties, particularly contractual duties
based on good faith and conscience. 72  For example, in early
cases the chancellors formulated a trustee's duties in terms of
good faith. These duties were extended to other fiduciaries and
finally applied to parties enjoying a relationship of special confi-
dence and trust. This latter application provided a basis for ex-
tending good faith and fair conduct requirements into the forma-
tion, performance and discharge of contracts; the accordion-like
character of concepts like "fiduciary,' ''trust," and "confidence"
readily permitted the expansion of contractual duties by judicial
fashioning of ad hoc confidential relationships.73
Recent insurance cases have recognized such new respon-
sibilities in response to the economic, legal and social realities at-
tending the insurer-insured relationship.74  The adhesive nature
" See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 34-45.
71 Phrases like "fiduciary relationship," "relationship of trust," and "confidential rela-
tionship" are used interchangeably by courts and the definition of each is vague. Each
phrase describes some social policy and is little more than a legal conclusion. See generally
Bogert, Confulential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 237 (1928);
Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A
Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1964).
" See generally Comment, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in Insur-
ance Law, 14 CAL. W. L. REv. 358 (1978). Although it is generally advanced in the legal
literature that insurance contracts are ones uberrimaefidei, such an assertion is not necessar-
ily correct. As one noted insurance scholar observes:
As a general rule, the relation between the parties to a contract of insur-
ance is that of... one contracting party to another ... rather than of trustee
and cestui que trust, or such as would arise by virtue of a will or other tes-
tamentary instrument.
... Ordinarily, an insurance company stands in no fiduciary relationship to
a legally competent applicant for annuity or other insurance contract.
3 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 23:11 (2d ed. 1959). But when the insured
reposes special confidence and trust in the superior knowledge and expertise of the in-
surer, the relationship may become "fiduciary". This higher standard of good faith and
fair dealing has been imposed in several instances: (1) third-party excess-liability cases in-
volving the insurer's duty to make good faith efforts to settle pursuant to its liability policy
(see, e.g., Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966); Southern Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 668, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (1952)); (2) cases
concerning misrepresentations by insurer or its agent (see, e.g, Kennedy v. Flo-Tronics Inc.,
274 Minn. 327, 143 N.W.2d 827 (1966); Peterson v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 74 S.D. 334, 52
N.W.2d 479 (1952); Bowers v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21 Tenn. App. 227, 108
S.W.2d 798 (1937); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 5 (1942)); (3) cases involving the duty to communi-
cate information to the insured during the performance stage (see e.g., Meirthew v. Last,
376 Mich. 33, 34, 135 N.W.2d 353, 355 (1965) (reservation-of-rights notice); Bowler v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969)).
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of insurance contracts necessitates the insured's reliance on the
insurance company's good faith and fair dealing. Since the in-
sured cannot bargain, he does not seek a commercial advantage as
in the ordinary contract; rather, he seeks security. Classical con-
tract rules are inadequate to handle insurers that abuse their
economic power. Classical contract law neither deters wrongdoing
nor fully compensates the insured for covered, first-party los-
ses.7 5  Finally, an insurance company is similar to a utility or an
enterprise affected with the public interest. Its relationship to its
insureds and society is quasi-public in nature.76 In sum, because
its business is public, and its contracts adhesive, an insurer should
be held to a high standard of conduct. As one court stated, "An
insurer owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith
and fair dealing that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of
the benefits of the policy." 77
3. Transactional Nature of the Contract
Ironically, Langdell's case system of legal instruction helped
precipitate the destruction of his unified contract theory. When
law teachers and students applied "first principles" to recurrent
factual situations, the principles sometimes needed modification.
Nevertheless, law teachers were reluctant to acknowledge these
factual sub-groupings and cross-groupings, and stubbornly de-
fended a theoretical unity of legal principles.7 8  When different
types of contracts were finally separated along transactional
lines,7 9 the classicists' unitary law of contract yielded to several laws
of contracts. Thus, in recognizing new contactual duties, courts
considered the special nature of each underlying transaction as
well as the circumstances of the contract's formation and the rela-
tionship and status of the parties.
Courts facing the same legal issue may apply different rules
depending on whether the contract involves real property, per-
sonal services, goods, or construction. For example, contract
theory tolerates considerable defaults in a building contract under
7' See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
71 See notes 78-95 and accompanying text infra.
" Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93
(1970).
78 Compare text accompanying note 61 supra.
' Typical schisms are employment, construction, manufacturing, government, fran-
chise, commercial and residential real property, and consumer contracts.
350 [Vol. 65:330
COMMERCIAL GOOD FAITH
the rule of substantial performance,"° but requires perfect per-
formance in a sale-of-goods contract.81 The inquiry shifts from
the abstract principles of classical theory to the instant facts. The
classical theorists focused on objective, external facts which insu-
lated pure doctrinal cathedrals from the defilement of transac-
tional facts. Holmes, Langdell, and Williston valued the simplicity
and certainty of a few first principles and objective standards set
by courts instead of unpredictable juries. Also, by eschewing fact-
based rules and decisions they differentiated contract sharply
from tort.
Today, contract law is focusing more on basic facts than on
objective rules,8 2 and there is a corresponding merger of tort and
contract.8 3  Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code illustrates
the trend. It directs courts to consider a rich variety of transac-
tional facts in sale-of-goods cases.84  As some contextual studies
show,8 5 courts and legislatures are developing both special rules
80 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 52, at 411. The distinction is that a buyer of
goods can easily return them but a dissatisfied landowner retains the structure. It seems
only fair to acknowledge the greater likelihood of unjust enrichment that construction con-
tracts present. Id.
", But the perfect tender rule of U.C.C. article II is something of a myth. See Com-
ment, Substantial Performance: The Real Alternative to Perfect Tender Under the U.C.C., 12
Hous. L. REV. 437 (1975).
82 "Why ask whether a unilateral contract could be revoked by the offeror prior to full
performance? Better to know who the parties were, the circumstances of the bargain, and
any relevant background or consequence. Was it a consumer sale? A brokerage contract? A
construction contract? Of what type?" Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past, Present and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 805, 806.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2)(b), 1-205, 2-202, 2-208, 2-303(2).
85 Dissatisfaction with the classical methodology led to the contextual approach to law.
See White, From Sociological Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America,
58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1000-12 (1972). For a sampling of context studies, see Dauer, Govern-
ment Contractors, Commercial Banks, and Miller Act Sureties -A Question of Priorities, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 943 (1973); Havighurst, Services in the Home -A Study of Contract
Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386 (1932); Macaulay, Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND.
L. REV. 1051 (1966); McDowell, Contracts in the Family, 45 B.U.L. REV. 43 (1965); Mueller,
Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833; Schultz, The Firm
Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237
(1952); Sher, Funeral Prearrangement: Mitigating the Undertaker's Bargaining Advantage, 15
STAN. L. REV. 415 (1963); Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L. J. 525 (1969); Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado
About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 83. For an example of teaching materials using a contex-
tual approach, see E. FARNSWORTH, W. YOUNG & H. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRAcTs 672-816 (2d ed. 1972).
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for particular transactional problems and broad standards, such as
good faith and fair dealing, which are adaptable to a variety of
situations.
Insurance is a recognizable transactional subdivision of
general-law contracts which receives special treatment because of
its quasi-monopolistic nature. The business and contracts of insur-
ance are heavily regulated through legislative, administrative, and
judicial controls because the insurance industry is deemed quasi-
public in nature. 86  Such contractual regulation is neither new
nor aberrational. For centuries, contract law has set special rules
(such as allowing punitive damages) against anyone with
monopolistic power who performs public services.8 7  In fifteenth
century England the surgeon, barber, innkeeper, victualler, or
carrier probably had a monopoly in the community; consequently
courts created special rules to protect the public against exploita-
tion by those engaged in common callings. 88 Today, the common
carrier or public utility rather than the smith or ferryman is af-
fected with a public interest because of its monopoly or quasi-
monopoly power. Although the cast of characters has changed,
the roots of current law on public service monopolies lie in special
legal rules which spring from the regulation of common call-
ings. 89  The underlying rationale of protection against exploita-
tion or oppression persists. 90
This policy is especially appropriate in the insurance con-
text.91 As early as 1882, courts acknowledged the disparity of
economic resources, knowledge and bargaining power between in-
86 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976); Christian
v. American Home Assur., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of Am.,
248 S.C. 285, 149 S.E.2d 771 (1966); Mutual Aid v. Williams, 219 Tenn. 95, 407 S.W.2d
171 (1966).
87 See, e.g., Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17
HARV. L. REv. 156 (1904).
88 Id. at 160-61.
89 Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 CoLum. L.
REV. 514, 616, 743 (1911).
90 Professor Sullivan concludes that "the fundamental justification for the award of
punitive damages in public service corporation cases has been the desire to both punish
and protect against the abuse of economic power." Sullivan, supra note 2, at 226.
8! [Blecause of the great disparity of financial resources which generally exists
between insurer and insured and the fact that insurance companies, like com-
mon carriers and utilities, are regulated and clearly affected with a public in-
terest, we recognize the wisdom of a rule which would deter refusals on the
part of insurers to pay valid claims when the refusals are both unjustified and
in bad faith.
Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 116, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1976).
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surer and insured, and imposed a duty of good faith and fair
dealing on the insurer.92  The United States Supreme Court in-
1914 recognized the monopolistic character of insurance com-
panies and stated that since the insurance business is "clothed with
a public interest" 9 3 it is subject to stringent governmental controls.
The insurer's duty is therefore greater than that arising in the
normal commercial contract. The state, in a sense, is a party to
the contract and, because of its vested interest, it imposes duties
like good faith and fair dealing.94
The progression in contract law is to go beyond abstract first
principles. The judiciary now evaluates how the contract was
formed, the relationship of the parties to each other, and the na-
ture of the particular transaction. In the first-party insurance
area, the result has been the development of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the claims process. 95
II
BAD-FAITH BREACH OF CONTRACT
The courts of at least twenty-one states9 6 have recognized that
92 Germania Ins. Co. v. Rudwid, 80 Ky. 223 (1882).
93 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 415 (1914). Accord, O'Gorman &
Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
94 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
95 The insurance business is governmentally regulated to a substantial degree. It
is affected with a public interest and offers services of a quasi-public na-
ture .... An insurer has a special relationship to its insured and has special
implied-in-law duties toward the insured.... To some extent this special rela-
tionship and these special duties take cognizance of the great disparity in the
economic situations and bargaining abilities of the insurer and the insured.
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
9' Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So. 2d 726 (1976), discussed
in 8 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 241, 258-62 (1977); Stephan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 26 Ariz. App.
367, 548 P.2d 1179 (1976) (dicta); Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908
(Ark. 1978) (dicta); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn.
Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975)
(dicta); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 616-17, 349 N.E.2d 173, 185
(1976); Sexton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Ind. App. 529, 337 N.E.2d 527 (1975);
Ausden v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972), discussed in 25 DRAKE L.
REv. 900 (1976); Venable v. Import Volkswagen, 214 Kan. 43, 519 P.2d 667 (1974) (dicta);
Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978), noted in 30 MAINE L.
REv. 308 (1979); Krajenke'v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 68 Mich. App. 211, 242 N.W.2d 70
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plaintiffs may recover extra-contract damages97 from first-party
insurers who act in bad faith by failing to pay well-founded
claims. A number of federal courts have followed suit.98  The
import of this trend is not yet fully apparent; the seminal case was
only decided in 1968. 99 Nevertheless, legislatures in seventeen
states have reinforced the trend by enacting first-party penalty
acts that impose liability for bad-faith failure to pay, 100 thereby
precluding the need for judicial action. 1 1 Under the cir-
cumstances it is safe to call this expansion of contract liability a
groundswell of substantial proportion.
(1976) (new trial ordered); Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688,
143 N.W.2d 612 (1966); Larson v. District Ct., 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967);
Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703 (1976); Sukup v. State, 19 N.Y.2d 519,
227 N.E.2d 842, 281 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1967) (dicta); Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins.
Co., 89 Misc. 2d 822, 392 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1977); United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 619-20, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1975); Newton v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976) (dicta), noted in 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
685, 686 (1977; Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970); Chris-
tian v. American Home Assur. Co., 557 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977), noted in 13 TULSA L.J. 606
(1978); Diamon v. Pennsylvania Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 552, 372 A.2d
1218, 1227 (1977); Kiecker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 5 Wash. App. 871, 491 P.2d 244 (1971)
(dicta). Cf Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316 (1964) (extra-
contract damages limited to punitive damages to redress fraudulent breach).
97 In the insurance context, extra-contract damages are any in excess of policy amount
plus interest.
" See, e.g., Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 325 F.2d 785 (9th
Cir. 1963); Alliance Ins. Co. v. Alper-Salvage Co., 19 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1927) (applying
Tennessee law); Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367,
1369-70 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Helton v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Mont.
1975). Cf Carter v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 423 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(only upon showing of malice or oppression); Short v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 307 F. Supp.
768 (D.W.V. 1969) (punitive damages only for wanton conduct of a tortious nature).
99 Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1968).
100 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4102 (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 627.428 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); IDAHO CODE § 41-1839
(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. § 40-256
(1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:656, :657 (West 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24A, § 2436
(Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon.Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359
(1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1219 (West 1976); S.C. CODE §§ 38-9-320, 9-330 (1976);
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 58-12-3 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1968); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. arts. 3.62, .62-1, 10.13 (Vernon 1961); Wyo. STAT. § 26-15-126 (1977). See
Holmes, A Model First-Party Insurance Excess-Liability Act, 14 GA. L. REV. - (1980).
101 Some states with first-party penalty acts have nonetheless allowed a judicial claim for
relief so that insureds have a rational choice in this excess liability area. See, e.g., Gibson v.
National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-24A,
§ 2436 (1974).
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A. History of the First-Party Excess Liability Claim
Classical contract theory traditionally prevented courts from
awarding damages in excess of the policy amount plus interest to
first-party insureds. 10 2  California courts pioneered the break-
down of this limitation by constructing an independent theory of
relief. Their first step was to remove the blindfold imposed by
classical theory and investigate the motivations for the breach.
Classical limitations still apply to simple breach cases; only if the
court concludes that the insurer's conduct is unconscionable, in
bad faith, or outrageous, is it likely to turn away from classical
rules and adopt a theory of relief that permits broader recovery.
The second step was to find an appropriate theory of relief.
California courts experimented with several approaches to first-
party insurance excess liability claims. They progressed from
fraud' 0 3 to invasion of a protected property interest coupled with
intentional infliction of emotional distress' 0 4 and finally to a new
theory-bad faith breach of contract.'0 5
1. Fraud
Most cases of unjustified refusal to pay insurance benefits in-
volve either fraudulent inducement to enter an insurance contract
or fraudulent conduct in failing to pay. Thus the earliest cases
used the tort 0 6 action of fraud to allow insureds a broader mea-
sure of damages than that available under traditional contract law.
The California Court of Appeals in Wetherbee v. United Insurance
Company of America10 7 vitalized this theory by diluting the long-
standing requirement that plaintiffs prove fraudulent intent at the
time their contract was formed. It held that this requirement
could be satisfied by inferring fraudulent intent from the insurer's
post-formation conduct, such as willful failure to pay benefits.
102 See notes 22-34 and accompanying text supra.
103 Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 931, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1964).
104 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
105 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
10' Courts often characterized their developing theories of excess liability as tort, not
contract. This characterization is preserved in this historical discussion. Properly under-
stood, however, first-party excess liability for bad-faith breach does not fit into any tradi-
tional pigeonhole, but draws upon contract, tort, and equity. See notes 157-205 and accom-
panying text infra.
107 265 Cal. App.2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
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With an occasional exception, 10 8 however, cases utilizing this
theory actually involve fraud in the performance, not the induce-
ment. Apparently the California courts allow this tortured infer-
ence as a fictional expedient to authorize recovery in cases like
Wetherbee.' 09 But this solution is analytically unsound. The theory
ought to focus directly on the conduct that gave rise to an in-
sured's grievance-abusive settlement tactics occurring at the per-
formance stage. Moreover, there are practical disadvantages grow-
ing out of a fraud action, such as overcoming strict evidentiary
rules for proving scienter."t 0 Because of these theoretical and
practical drawbacks, the California quest for a sound, indepen-
dent theory of relief continued.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Many insureds after a business or personal loss are in a dif-
ficult financial situation, prompting some insurers to try economic
coercion to force the insured into an unfair compromise."' In
1970, the California Court of Appeals took note of such practices
in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Company. 112 Retreat-
ing to the classical contract womb, Western National contended
that any failure to make disability payments was a simple contract
breach for which damages should be limited to the policy amount.
Defense counsel stipulated that the insurer's conduct was outra-
108 See, e.g., Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 325 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.
1963) (wrongfully obtained releases could support a claim for punitive damages).
109 Relief was certainly justified in Wetherbee. Shortly after the 70-year-old plaintiff
purchased the disability policy, she sent it to the company for cancellation. She feared that
it would be terminated at the whim of the insurer. The defendant, through its counsel,
wrote her a reassuring letter: "When you are sick or hurt you will draw your benefits as
long as you live." Upon receipt, she retained her policy and even bought another one.
When she was disabled by a stroke, the company issued checks sporadically and two years
after the accident wrote her doctor an artful letter: "It appears that patient is not continu-
ously confined within the house. Is this correct?" Following an affirmative reply, the com-
pany terminated payments even though the doctor wrote that she required crutches and a
wheelchair and had left her house only for medical treatment, church and social club meet-
ings. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 925-27, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67. Ms. Wetherbee eventually recov-
ered policy benefits of $1,050 and $200,000 punitive damages. Wetherbee v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1971).
110 For discussions of the disadvantages of the fraud action, see DuBois, The Spectre of
Punitive Damages in First Party Actions -Part II, 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 242 (1975); Lascher, The
Imposition of Punitive Damages in the Enforcement of Insurance Contracts, ABA INS. NEGLIGENCE
& COMPENSATION SECTION, PROCEEDINGS 220 (1971); Parks, Recovery of Extra-Contract Dam-
ages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 FoRuN, 43 (1973).
11' See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
112 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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geous. Fletcher had incurred a back injury and submitted a claim
for disability benefits. The examining doctors unanimously opined
that Fletcher was disabled by a work-related injury. Western Na-
tional, however, insisted that Fletcher was suffering from a sick-
ness, which would restrict its exposure to two years instead of the
duration of the disorder. The claims manager undertook a con-
certed campaign to compel Fletcher either to forfeit the policy or
to accept a disadvantageous settlement. Fletcher sued for both
compensatory and punitive damages. As the court explained, the
company's claim of mere contract breach
[r]aises the question whether threatened and actual bad faith
refusals to make payments under a disability insurance policy,
maliciously employed by the insurer in concert with false and
threatening communications, for the purpose of causing the in-
sured to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a
nonexistent dispute, may legally give rise to a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or some other
cause of action sounding in tort.'1 3
The Fletcher court inferred wrongful intent from Western Na-
tional's harassment and adopted a pure tort theory of relief. It
found the commission of two torts -intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress 114 and intentional interference with a protected
property interest - that invaded two distinct interests - the in-
sured's interest in maintaining peace of mind and his economic
interest in full compensation.
Fletcher's two-pronged intentional tort approach admirably de-
fined the interests at stake in first-party suits and may have pro-
vided a necessary transition to a more logical theory of relief.
Neither theory, however, has proven satisfactory. A cause of ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress unduly limits
both liability and damages. It limits damages because an insured
can only recover general damages for emotional distress and
damages for simple breach of contract (policy amount plus in-
113 Id. at 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
214 Prior to Fletcher, only two cases acknowledged the legitimacy of the tort in this insur-
ance context. Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 10 Ariz. App. 560, 460 P.2d 666 (1969)
(dicta) (relief denied because conduct not outrageous but only hurt insured's feelings);
Frishett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (1966)
(claim for emotional distress stated in complaint that alleged the insurer unjustly withheld
payments, made false statements and attempted in bad faith to defeat plaintiff's claim).
The tort was well-accepted in California in non-insurance contexts. See State Rubbish Col-
lectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (debt collection).
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terest).115 But an insured who is not promptly paid policy ben-
efits can incur economic harm such as lost equity in property,'
additional lost earnings due to lack of medical care, and even,
bankruptcy. These economic losses are not recoverable in an emo-
tional distress action.
The emotional distress tort is also restrictive because it im-
poses liability on a defendant only if a number of requirements
are met.116  Perhaps the most restrictive of these is that the de-
fendant must be guilty of outrageous conduct. Fletcher recognized
that insurers have a privilege to assert their legal rights in good
faith and inform insureds of their position. This privilege exists
even if it is substantially certain that such conduct will cause men-
tal distress. 17  Only when an insurer uses outrageous tactics does
a privileged communication become an unprivileged tort. Out-
rageousness certainly connotes something stronger than bad-faith
conduct; it is generally defined as conduct which exceeds all
bounds usually tolerated by a decent society. 1 8  The distinction
between "outrageous" and "bad faith" lies in the difference be-
tween the intent of the actor and the nature of his act. A finding
of bad faith involves an inquiry into the insurer's intent; the com-
pany must know that it did not have a reasonable basis in law or
fact to deny payment."19 Conduct is outrageous only if it leads
one to exclaim "outrageous" regardless of the actor's intent. 120
115 In most jursdictions he might also recover punitive damages. But a recent case re-
fused to allow punitive damages, stating that since the basis of the action is outrageous
conduct, compensatory relief is adequately punitive. Eckenrode v. Life of Amer. Ins. Co.,
470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting Knierim v. Izzo 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E. 2d 157
(1961)). Most cases, however, reason that compensatory damages do not match the nature
of conduct and are therefore not a sufficient deterrent. See Lambert, Commercial Litigation,
35 J. AM. TRIAL LAW Ass'N 164, 223 (1974).
116 The court in Fletcher adopted the requirements set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). The requirements of intent to do harm,
extreme and outrageous conduct, and severe emotional distress pose problems for any
plaintiff. Regarding severe mental suffering, Fletcher mollified the problem by adopting in
part Comment j to § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which defines severe emo-
tional distress to include "highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment or worry." 10 Cal. App. 3d at
397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
117 10 Cal. App. 3d at 395-96, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
"' Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).
" See note 149 and accompanying text infra.
120 See RESTATEMERNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965):
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
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When an insurer uses high pressure tactics or harassment to
force the insured to settle for less than his due, many courts hold
the conduct to be outrageous. 121 Apparently, no court has found
outrageous conduct without affirmative conduct. Thus, a mere
denial of liability or refusal to pay, even though unreasonable and
in bad faith, is not deemed outrageous. In an Iowa case, for in-
stance, the insurer's conduct was not outrageous when it only
waited until an arson investigation was completed so the parties
could fix the amount of loss by agreement.1 22  In contrast, non-
feasance can constitute bad faith conduct.123
3. Intentional Interference With a Protected Property Interest
The Fletcher court asserted as the second ground of its hold-
ing that the defendant's conduct was an intentional, tortious inter-
ference with the insured's protected property interest in the policy
proceeds. This theory fosters an appealing symmetry. Since courts
protect contractual interests from intentional harm inflicted by a
third party stranger,124 afortiori the same interests should be pro-
tected from intentional harm by a party to the contract. Contract-
ing parties should not be held to a lower standard of conduct
than a stranger. This theory acknowledges that in an executory
contract the parties may not only have in personam but also in rem
rights. The res in the insurance context is the promised monetary
benefit that the insurer holds in a quasi-trust as a quasi-fiduciary.
This proposition is well-accepted in the third-party context where
the insurer holds the res and must exercise due care and good
faith when using it to settle claims brought by third-party claim-
ants. 25 If an insured has an in rem interest in monies that the
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress,
or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another
tort.
£21 See Eckenrode v. Life of Amer. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (insurer con-
trived a defense to force widow to settle deceased's husband's life insurance policy); World
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 322 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1975);
Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 33 (Dist. Ct. App.) (insulting and slander-
ing insured), cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1970).
122 Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972).
123 See note 142 and accompanying text infra.
124 For a discussion of this tort, see Comment, Contractual Relations: When Are.They Also a
Tort, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 687 (1976).
122 See Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
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insurer must use in good faith to pay on his behalf in liability dis-
putes then it is logical to recognize that same in rem interest and
the corresponding duty when the insurer must pay the monies to
its insured in the first-party context.
The problem with this theory is that, with one exception, 1 6
no court has adopted, or even discussed, the expansive tort of
intentional interference with a protected property interest.
Nevertheless, courts may have ratified this theory under a differ-
ent label: the tort of bad faith. 127
4. Bad Faith
California law on the tort of bad faith has its roots in third-
party excess liability cases, beginning with Comunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co.,128 decided in 1958. In Comunale, the
California Supreme Court held that a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is implicit in every contract and extended that duty to
every insurance contract. It also held that all parties have a duty
to do nothing which will injure the other party's right to receive
contractual benefits, and that the insurer must accord the in-
sured's interests at least as much consideration as its own. 29 Any
insurer who violates this covenant by not reasonably settling does
so at its own risk; insureds are compensated for all resulting det-
riment, including judgments in excess of policy limits.
This implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not
applied to first-party claims until 1972 when the California Court
of Appeal decided Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp.' 30 In response to the insurer's argument that the tort of
126 The California Supreme Court adopted the Fletcher rationale in Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
127 See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973) (established tort of bad faith breach of contract); notes 133-36 and accompanying
text infra. The Gruenberg court made an approving reference to Fletcher's intentional inter-
ference rationale:
[Tihe existence of a contractual relationship does not insulate defendant insur-
ers from liability that is "ordinarily visited upon tortfeasors" for interfering with
a property interest of the insured in receiving the benefits of the agreement.
Therefore, even though the duty allegedly assumed by defendant insurers
arises from an existing contractual relationship, this duty is independent of the
performance of plaintiff's contractual obligations.
Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Thus Fletcher may lie disguised but
accepted in Gruenberg.
128 50 Qal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
129 Id. at 656, 328 P.2d at 201.
130 25 Cal. App.3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
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bad faith as nurtured in third-party actions like Comunale should
be limited to third-party claims, the court stated:
This implied obligation requires an insurer to deal in good
faith and fairly with its insured in handling an insured's claim
against it. Here, Employers deliberately, willfully and in bad
faith withheld payment of the Richardson claim months after it
knew the claim to be completely valid. 13'
Although the court extended the covenant of good faith to cover
first-party cases, Richardson added little to the developing limits of
this new tort. Because coverage was obvious, it was easy for the
court to conclude that the company's denial was unreasonable,
unwarranted and in bad faith. The court did not, however,
suggest the appropriate response to a situation where liability
under a policy is questionable and the insurer is questioning by
refusing to pay. In addition to this shortcoming, Richardson
seemed to tie recovery for emotional distress to the outrageous
conduct and severe distress requirements of the intentional inflic-
tion tort which was recognized in Fletcher. 132
In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 133 the California Supreme
Court made progress toward remedying these deficiencies. After
fire destroyed the insured's restaurant and cocktail lounge, he
brought an action for the loss against his three insurers. An adjuster
retained by the carriers informed the arson squad that Gruenberg
was over-insured. Arson charges were filed against him. An at-
torney representing the three companies requested that the in-
sured submit to an examination under oath in compliance with
the policies' cooperation clauses. When the insured asked for a
postponement until completion of the felony prosecution, he was
informed that coverage would be denied if he did not cooperate.
After he failed to appear for questioning, coverage was denied.
The arson charges were later dismissed, but the insurers still re-
fused to pay, claiming noncooperation.
Gruenberg contended that the adjuster supplied information
to the police to create a false impression that he had a motive for
arson and give the insurers an excuse to deny coverage. He sued
for severe economic damage, severe emotional distress, loss of
earnings and various consequential damages, and sought both
131 Id. at 239, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
132 Id. at 241, 247, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 553, 557-58.
133 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973) (en banc with Roth, J.,
dissenting).
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compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint alleged that
these damages were a "direct and proximate result of the out-
rageous conduct and bad faith of the defendants." 134  By inter-
mixing allegations of outrageous conduct, severe distress, and bad
faith in the same complaint the plaintiff touched all bases. Evi-
dently he was unsure how to state his claim accurately. The court
held that a claim of tortious, bad-faith breach of contract had
been stated.135  It allowed Gruenberg to recover "extra-contract"
damages, including damages for mental distress, on a theory un-
fettered by the outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress
requirements of the intentional infliction tort.' 36  Gruenberg thus
originated an independent bad faith tort, a significant advance
over Richardson. 137
134 Id. at 572, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
135 Id. at 581, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the insurer
must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities.
Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by
refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by
the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485 (emphasis omitted).
136 Id. at 580-81, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490:
In Fletcher, plaintiff's theory of recovery expressed in his complaint ... was
predicated on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress alone. Quite
naturally, therefore, the court concluded that severe emotional distress is a re-
quisite element of recovery. However, the mere fact the action there involved
the liability of an insurer for its tortious conduct, measured by the elements [of]
the intentional infliction of emotional distress, does not mean that those same
elements must be applied where, as in the instant case, recovery is sought on a
totally distinct theory.
137 Two other aspects of Gruenberg are worthy of comment. First, the elimination of the
outrageous conduct requirement for recovery of emotional-distress damages was a mixed
blessing for insureds. Proof of outrageous conduct was originally required to help prevent
spurious claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). In Gruenberg, no proof
of outrageous conduct was mandated because there was property loss. 9 Cal.3d at 580, 510
P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Accord, Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Gas. & Sur.
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (N.D. Fla. 1976). This holding seems to require corroborat-
ing evidence of economic loss before mental suffering damages could be recovered in a
bad faith action. Because Gruenberg did not indicate how substantial the loss must be to
justify mental-distress damages, this ingredient could have circumscribed the new tort.
Later cases, however, indicate that the loss can be minimal, such as incurring attorney's
fees or loss of the use of money. See Eagan v. Mutual of Omaha, 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133
Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 363-64,
118 Cal. Rptr. 581, 584-85 (1975). With such broad constructions of economic loss, this
requirement does not impose a serious barrier to the award of mental-distress damages in
a bad faith action.
Greunberg's final notable aspect concerns the "unconditional" nature of the insurer's
duty to act in good faith. Some commentators have read the Gruenberg opinion as holding
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The final case in this historical discussion is Silberg v. Califor-
nia Life Insurance Co., 138 decided in 1974. Silberg had a hospitali-
zation policy with defendant. The policy excluded coverage of
''any loss caused by or resulting from ... injury or sickness for
which compensation is payable under any Workmen's Compensa-
tion ... Law." Plaintiff severed his right foot while working for
his landlord under a rent reduction agreement. He filed a claim
with both defendant and his workmen's compensation carrier.
The workmen's compensation carrier denied coverage on the
that the good faith duty is absolute, and have concluded that it is a one way street which
encourages dishonest, contract-breaching insureds to take advantage of insurers. See, e.g.,
Houser, First Party Claims for More Than Insurance Policy Limits-A Defendant's Viewpoint, 11
FORUN 529 (1976). Some argue, for example, that an insurer cannot insist, under a coop-
eration clause, that an insured comply with proven investigation methods and that there-
fore the ability to avoid fraudulent claims is seriously hampered. See, e.g., Comment, Good
Faith and Fire Insurance Contracts, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 847 (1975); Comment, An Indepen-
dent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts - Gruenberg v. Aetna Insur-
ance Co., 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 492, 500 (1974). There is language in the opinion which
seems to suggest this view:
We conclude, therefore, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the
part of defendant insurance companies is an absolute one. At the same time, we
do not say that the parties cannot define, by the terms of the contract, their
respective obligations and duties. We say merely that no matter how those
duties are stated, the non-performance by one party of its contractual duties
cannot excuse a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the other
party while the contract between them is in effect and not rescinded.
9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
A careful reading of this language, however, reveals that the court merely reiterated
the obvious: A tort duty is independent, not conditioned upon another's tort duty. The
court stated that the tort duty of good faith is not bound by the contract doctrine that, in a
bilateral contract, each party's promise (or duty) is constructively conditioned upon the
other party's promise.
For an excellent discussion of constructive conditions in contract law, see J. MURRAY,
MURRAY ON CONTRAcTs 301-09 (rev. ed. 1974). The court quoted Comunale just before the
passage quoted above to make the point that the duty of good faith is an implied covenant
that neither party will injure the other's contractual rights. 9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at
1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. Moreover, the duty pertains to acting fairly in performing
contract duties. If an insured fails to cooperate, hampers an investigation or otherwise fails
to fulfill any required condition precedent to payment under the policy, the insurer's duty
to pay is not activated. As long as the insurer's contract duty to pay is dormant, it does not
violate its tort duty of good faith by refusing to pay. Courts have not specifically followed
this line of reasoning, but they have found that an insurer's failure to pay is justified when
the insured fails to cooperate (Hodge v. Cimmarron Ins. Co., 338 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. Mo.
1972) (insurer entitled to defend on ground that insured failed to supply proof of loss and
business records)) or fails to fulfill a condition precedent established by the policy (En-
glemann v. Standard Mut. Ins. Co., 4 I11. App. 3d 55, 58, 280 N.E. 2d 240, 242 (1972)). See
also Billington v. Interinsurance Exch., 71 Cal. 2d 728, 456 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326
(1979).
138 11 Cal.3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
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ground that Silberg was not an employee. Although California
Life knew that workmen's compensation coverage was doubtful, it
nonetheless denied coverage under the exclusion quoted above. 139
At the time of the accident, Silberg was 39 years old, had two
minor children, and earned $500 per month. His severed foot was
surgically restored, but he needed five additional operations. Be-
cause the insurer did not pay Silberg's medical bills, he had to
resort to ruses to be admitted to hospitals and had to use differ-
ent surgeons. His unpaid medical bills made him a poor credit
risk; he could not borrow money and his business failed. He had
to move five times because of nonpayment of rent; his utilities
were shut off several times for nonpayment; his wheelchair was
repossessed; on several occasions he could not afford medication
to ease his constant pain; he suffered two nervous breakdowns.
Silberg sued seeking to recover the policy benefits, damages for
mental and physical distress, and punitive damages. A jury
awarded him $75,000 in compensatory damages140 and $500,000
in punitive damages. The trial court, granting the insurer's mo-
tion for a new trial, held that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict and that the damages were excessive.' 4 ' On
appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
reinstated the verdict as to compensatory damages, but ratified
the new trial as to punitive liability.
The appellate court's opinion clarifies the bad-faith tort in
several respects. First, it shows that the bad faith theory, unlike
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 142 requires
no affirmative conduct to justify recovery. The defendant in Sil-
berg merely refused to pay without adequate grounds. 43 Second,
Silberg segregated "good faith" from mere negligence; the stan-
dard for testing an insurer's good faith is not just the typical ob-
jective tort standard for negligence. California Life's first defense
was based on the customary practice in the industry of denying
benefits when an application for workmen's compensation had
been made. Assuming such inaction is the customary practice
within the industry, 44 then arguably the merchant-insurer has
139 Id. at 457-58, 463-64, 521 P.2d at 1106-07, 1111, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714-715, 719.
140 "Compensatory damages" in this case included nonpunitive extra-contract damages.
See note 97 supra.
141 11 Cal.3d at 457-59, 521 P.2d at 1106-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714-16.
142 See text accompanying note 123 supra.
143 Silence in the face of a duty to speak is an example of inaction that constitutes bad-
faith conduct. See Holmes, supra note 9, at 432-49.
144 At trial there was sharp conflict in the evidence as to the customary practice. One
expert testified that the customary practice was for the insurer to pay the claim and then
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acted objectively in good faith by following industry practices. But
the Silberg court implictly acknowledged the equitable origin of
"good faith" 145 by scrutinizing the custom to ascertain if it was
repugnant to societal expectations of good faith and fair dealing.
The court states that the duty to act fairly is prescribed and de-
fined by law rather than by industry customs.' 46  Given the
strong probability that Silberg would not receive any workmen's
compensation, the insurer should have paid Silberg's medical bills.
If Silberg subsequently received a worker's compensation award,
California Life could effectively protect its interest by placing a
lien on that award. 147  The court, in effect, said that what is cus-
tomarily done may have some evidentiary value on the question of
what ought to be done, but that what ought to be done is fixed by
a legal standard of reasonable prudence and fair play in paying
claims. The insurer's duty, according to the court, is "to give the
interests of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives
to its own interests." 148
protect its interest by placing a lien on a workmen's compensation award. Id. at 459-60, 521
P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
145 For a discussion of the equitable origin and nature of the concept of good faith, see
Holmes, supra note 9, at 384-95.
146 11 Cal. 3d at 462, P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717 Statutory and case law may
differ regarding the binding effect of usage of trade or customary practices. The U.C.C.
implied warranty of merchantability, for example, codifies the customary standard by using
a no-worse-than-anybody else ethic. To be merchantable goods must be "at least such as...
pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, and ... are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c). Some courts
seem reluctant to scrutinize the fairness of the industry standard. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank
of Philadelphia v. Anderson, 7 Pa. D. & C. 2d 661 (1954). There, the bank argued that it
had complied with customary commercial practices in response to a charge that it had not
acted in good faith. The court held that the bank had acted in good faith and said: "True,
[UCC] section 1-201 defines good faith as being honesty in fact.... No evidence was pre-
sented, however, indicating that the [bank's] failure to make inquiry ... was in any sense a
divergence from common banking or commercial practice." Id. at 666.
247 II Cal. 3d at 460-61, 521 P.2d at 1108-09, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
148 Id. at 460, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. See notes 208-10 and accompany-
ing text infra. The point to underscore is that the Silberg court held insurers to this stan-
dard of equal consideration regardless of the customary practices. Of course, the ordinary
negligence standard may or may not require more than compliance with the usual and
customary conduct of others. Although some courts tried to turn the inference from cus-
tom into an immutable test of negligence, it is clear that ordinary usages and customs must
meet a test of reasonableness. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 165-68 (4th ed.
1971). As Judge Hand explains,
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however
persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required....
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Silberg also helps clarify the bad-faith tort by showing that
both subjective and objective inquiries are involved in a finding of
bad faith, even where the court fails to distinguish them. The first
question a court must address is objective: Did the insurer have
reasonable grounds for rejecting the claim? Few courts are likely,
however, to assess damages against a defendant for bad faith sim-
ply because it was objectively wrong in refusing to pay. Usually, to
invoke the law's wrath an insurer must also refuse to pay know-
ing, or having reason to know, that its refusal is unreasonable. 149
In Silberg the court ignored this subjective element. It held that the
exclusion clause was, "[a]t best"150 ambiguous and construed it
against the insurer in accord with the principle of contra proferen-
tern.151  This holding seems to make the defendant liable for a
mere error. Arguably, California Life's only fault was to mis-
construe an ambiguous provision. As the court pointed out, how-
ever, the principle of contra proferentem is a "settled [rule] of con-
struction." 152  The court could reasonably charge California Life
with knowledge of this rule and of the ambiguity in its own con-
tract. 153  Thus the defendant in Silberg did have reason to know
that it was without justification in denying payment. It was liable
because it combined subjective dishonesty with objective error.
The final illuminating aspect of the opinion concerns the issue
of intent. Given the traditional spectrum of tort classifications-
innocent to negligent to intentional - the court held by negative
implication that the bad-faith tort is not an intentional one. Silberg
149 The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently held that knowledge of the absence of a
reasonable basis "may be inferred and imputed to an insurance company where there is a
reckless disregard or a lack of a reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to
facts or to proofs submitted by the insured." Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d
675, 693, 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (1978). See also Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is
in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 67 (1973). Recovery without this subjective element is based on
a strict liability theory, not bad faith. Some courts do apply strict liability to breach of
insurance contracts. Nonetheless, bad faith is likely to remain the dominant standard, at
least in the first party context. See notes 211-21 and accompanying text infra.
I50 11 Cal. 3d at 465, 521 P.2d at 1112, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
151 Id. at 465-66, 521 P.2d at 1112, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 720. See note 60 supra.
1t2 Id. at 466, 521 P.2d at 1112, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
M The exclusion in question stated that the policy did not cover "any loss caused by ...
injury ... for which compensation is payable under any Workmen's Compensation ...
Law." Id. at 463, 521 P.2d at 1111, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 719. This language could be con-
strued to mean either (1) the insurer would pay any medical expenses not paid for under
workmen's compensation, or (2) the insurer was not required to pay anything if the in-
sured recovered any amount under workmen's compensation.
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held that a mere finding of bad-faith conduct does not entitle the
insured to a punitive damage award. Basing its decision on a
California statute, the court stated that to justify a punitive dam-
age recovery the insurer's conduct must be oppressive, fraudulent
or malicious. 5 4 Therefore, punitive damages can only be
awarded for the commission of an intentional tort. The insurer
must act with "intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious
disregard of the plaintiffs rights." 155 Since the court seemed re-
luctant to infer malice from the insurer's conduct, 156 an insured
must prove actual malice to recover punitive damages. Thus, the
new tort of bad-faith conduct does not require fraudulent, mali-
cious oppressive or outrageous conduct. Intentional conduct or in-
tent to harm is a prerequisite only to the recovery of punitive
damages.
In sum, Silberg touched on four aspects of the bad-faith tort.
First, liability can be predicated on either action or inaction. Sec-
ond, an insurer is held to a higher standard of conduct than the
ordinary negligence standard; the carrier must put the insured's
interests on par with its own. Third, this equal-consideration re-
quirement necessitates both a subjective inquiry into the insurer's
state of mind and an objective inquiry into the reasonableness of
his conduct. Finally, the bad faith tort is not of the intentional
variety; fraud, malice, oppression or outrageous conduct need not
be proven. But these factors do determine whether the insurer is
liable for punitive damages as well as extra-contract compensatory
damages for breach of his covenant of good faith.
B. Theory and Standard for the New Extra Contract Claim
1. Theory
What theory should courts use to justify the recovery of
extra-contract damages? They can characterize bad faith denial or
delay of legitimate first party insurance claims as a breach of con-
tract, a violation of a legislatively imposed duty, 157 or a violation
of a judicially imposed duty springing either from tort or
154 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
"5 Id.
'5 See, e.g., Walton v. Anderson, 6 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1009-10, 86 Cal. Rptr. 345,
349-50 (1970). The general rule is that legal malice can be imputed from proof of illegal or
improper motives. See, e.g., Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 II1. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d
540 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
157 For a discussion of first-party penalty legislation, see Holmes, supra note 100 at -.
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equity.1 58  Assuming the absence of first-party penalty legislation,
the courts have three theories from which to choose arising out of
three different bodies of law: contract, tort, and equity.
Contract seems to be an inappropriate pigeonhole for a rule
which grants damages on a nonconsensual basis, as Gruenberg in-
dicates. 159 The Gruenberg court apparently concluded from this
infelicity, by process of elimination, that tort was the appropriate
category."' This characterization is appealing; relief such as
emotional distress damages has the flavor of tort. Unfortunately,
there is an equally plausible argument that bad faith does not fit
under the tort rubric either. Although tort and contract share a
common ancestry,161 the rule that a tort action can only lie for
misfeasance of a promise, not nonfeasance, evolved to distinguish
the two.1 62 The bad faith "tort," however, does not require an
injury by affirmative conduct.1 63  Therefore, the misfeasance-
nonfeasance distinction, if taken seriously, should disqualify bad
faith from classification as a tort.
15' In fact, a court may use several theories at once. See, e.g., Larson v. District Court,
149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
"9 [L]iability is imposed ... not for a bad faith breach of the contract but for
failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements.... That responsibility
is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself- to defend,
settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law....
9 Cal. 3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
160 The duty to so act is imminent in the contract whether the company is attend-
ing to the claims of third persons against the insured or the claims of the
insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith
withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort.
Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 486.
161 Modern tort descends from the trespass action, as does contract (via case and as-
sumpsit). F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, 65-70 (1958).
162 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OF TORTS § 18.6 (1956); Prosser, The Borderland of
Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS (1953). One New York case
summarizes the traditional learning:
It appears well settled that negligent conduct becomes actionable only when
it violates some specific duty. The failure to perform a contractual obligation is
never a tort unless it is also a violation of a legal duty. "Without duty, there can
be no breach of duty, and without breach of duty there can be no liability." "It
is the breach of the duty imposed by law and not of the contract obligation
which constitutes the tort. While such duty may arise out of contract, it is a
separate and distinct undertaking so that a breach of one will not necessarily
imply a breach of the other, although the same conduct may at times constitute
a tort as well as a breach of contract."
Shubitz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 59 Misc. 2d 732, 734, 301 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (1969)
(citations omitted). See, e.g., Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 573 S.W.2d 908 (Ark. 1978).
'63 See note 142 and accompanying text supra.
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The tort and contract categories do not accommodate bad
faith comfortably. Moreover, they are not particularly meaningful,
since there is no stable dividing line between tort and contract. An
obligation to do or forebear from doing an act may be imposed
upon an individual only by command of a legitimate government
having jurisdiction over him, or by that government's enforce-
ment of his voluntary undertaking of the obligation. The law of
torts exemplifies the former circumstance; the law of contracts
exemplifies the latter. Thus, theoretically, a tort duty is imposed
by law and a contractual duty is voluntarily assumed. But this
reasoning is too facile. Tort and contract do not divide neatly
along lines of imposed and assumed duties. Some tort duties arise
from a voluntary assumption, for example, undertaking to rescue
or inviting social guests. Moreover, for some time courts have
eroded classical contract theory by implying contract duties and
terms which the parties failed to provide.164
The misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction is no more helpful
in dividing tort from contract. The development of promissory
estoppel undercuts it. Courts can now award damages for breach
of a promise without any affirmative action and without consider-
ation guaranteeing that the promise was made seriously enough to
justify judicial enforcement. 65  Promissory estoppel resembles
tort as much as contract. 66  It is just one example of the doctri-
164 The process of implication is pervasive in contract law. Courts imply promises to
sidestep problems of indefiniteness and illusory promises, imply terms like notice require-
ments or constructive conditions, and imply duties like the duty to cooperate to assure
contract performance. See generally Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963); notes
182-90 and accompanying text infra.
165 See generally, G. GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 69-73 (1974); Henderson, Prom-
issory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969).
166 A little known but excellent study gives a broad-based historical perspective to the
development of promissory estoppel and concludes that it has more tort than contract
characteristics:
No complete identification of the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be
made: in the generalization of the doctrine, some "re-uniting of tort and con-
tract principles" appears and this makes it hard "to categorize the principle of
promissory estoppel as one of 'tort' or 'contract.' "
Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 IowA L. REv. 28, 45 (1949). In this respect promis-
sory estoppel is part of a process with wide-ranging significance whereby "the whole ques-
tion of contract is integrated in the larger realm of obligations, and this tends to put our
issues in the right perspective and to correct the misleading artificial distinctions between
breach of contract and other civil wrongs or torts." M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
95-96 (1933).
Modern contract law candidly admits that damages based upon promissory estoppel
may be less or more than those awarded by classical contraqt theory. The second version of
the Restatement definition of promissory estoppel added this language which allows for
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nal bridges between tort and contract that allow courts to ignore
artificial distinctions.
In the absence of any reliable criteria for making a choice
between tort and contract, courts often make a result-oriented dis-
tinction.' 67 The applicable statute of limitations, assignability of
the cause of action, and the applicable measure of damages, all
depend on the form of action. 168  Where characterizing an action
as tort or contract "affects the suit or its procedure, but not the
merits of the cause of action" ' 69 courts may allow a plaintiff to
choose the label that favors him most. This is especially likely if,
by doing so, the court can avoid a rule that it considers unjust.1 70
Moreover, where only one characterization gives rise to the appli-
cation of rules that seem appropriate to a particular fact situation,
a court is likely to adopt it. In the area of products liability, for
example, courts tend to label economic losses (loss of bargain) as
contract and personal injury or property losses as tort.' 7 1  This
distinction allocates the former to a contract measure of damages
and the latter to a tort measure. It is, however, difficult to under-
stand why a car that fails to operate and a car with a defect that
causes personal injury do not both involve a loss of bargain. 172
less: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Drafts No. 1-7 1973). Cases like Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 26 Wis.2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965), provide further support by granting
tort-like damages for what might be called a negotiation tort. In discussing Hoffman, Pro-
fessor Henderson opines:
[Slection 90 should serve as a distinct basis of liability without regard to theories
of bargain, contract, or consideration. The criteria which justify and limit the
application of promissory estoppel are to be determined exclusively by what
Section 90 says about the effects of nonperformance of promises.
Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 359
(1969).
167 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 148, at 621-22; Fridman, The Interaction of Tort
and Contract, 93 L.Q. REV. 422, 447 (1977); Note, The Elastic Concept of Tort and Contract as
Applied by the Courts of New York, 14 BROOKLYN L. REV. 196 (1948).
168 W. PROSSER, supra note 148, at 618-19.
169 Id. at 621.
170 Id. at 621-22.
171 In general, when a plaintiff suffers economic loss together with personal or property
damage, recovery for all losses and harms can be attained under any theory. But if only an
economic loss occurs, then the contract is supposedly the only theory available. See D. NOEL
& J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 105-14 (1974). For an extensive treat-
ment of the rule relating economic losses to contract, see Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding
Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493 (1978).
172 It is not possible to assign repair loss to the product and personal injury caused by
the product to different types of duties. Both result from breach of the same duty -the
product fails to conform to the customer's expectations which were fostered at least in part
by the seller's representations, express or implied.
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Instead of trying to shoehorn bad faith into categories that
are neither suitable nor useful, courts should employ a theory that
focuses directly on the issue to be decided and permits formula-
tion of appropriate rules. In the first-party insurance area, the
issue involves the proper measure of damages-what damages in
addition to the policy benefits should the plaintiff recover? In re-
solving that issue, a court ought to consider the following factors:
(1) how the contract was formed (bargain or adhesion model); 173
(2) status and relationship of the parties; 171 (3) transactional na-
ture of the contract; 175 (4) quantum of proof of damage; (5)
causal connection between the damage and the conduct; and, (6)
nature of conduct engaged in by defendant. Findings in a recent
study suggest that courts evaluate these six factors, of which the
nature of the defendant's conduct is most significant, 176 and
award damages accordingly. If the defendant's failure to pay is
reasonable or based on probable cause, courts generally follow the
classical contract rule by awarding the policy benefit plus in-
terest.1 77  But if the insurer acts in bad faith, courts in at least
twenty-one states17 8 will award extra-contract damages such as
economic consequential damages, mental distress damages, and at-
torney's fees. Moreover, if the court considers the insurer's con-
duct oppressive, outrageous, malicious, or fraudulent, then it may
grant punitive damages.179
When extra-contract and punitive damages are awarded, the
theory of recovery is neither tort nor contract. Either tag only
labels the bad faith theory in terms of traditional remedial
schemes. The theory underlying extra-contract claims originates
in equity. The sources of this theory are the great principles of
equity - conscience and good faith - which have made a two-
pronged attack upon contractual abuses permitted by the classical
173 See notes 51-64 and accompanying text supra.
174 See notes 65-77 and accompanying text supra.
175 See notes 78-95 and accompanying text supra.
176 The real reason why mental suffering and punitive damages were held not
recoverable in the contract cases cited ... is not simply that the cases were in
"contract," but that they did not involve sufficiently aggravated con-
duct.... The only factor of consequence is the type of conduct engaged in by
the defendant. Where the conduct justifies mental suffering or punitive dam-
ages, the court will be able to find a "tort."
Ribstein, Tort and Contract in Georgia, 30 MERCER L. REv. 303, 309 (1978).
177 See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
178 See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
179 See notes 222-59 and accompanying text infra.
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contract theory. Both are policing devices.1 8' The Uniform
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
have elevated them from emotionally satisfying incantations to au-
thentic contract doctrine. 181  Courts of equity use unconscionabil-
ity to prevent oppression and unfair surprise' 82 by excising mate-
rially offensive terms, such as disclaimers of warranties and limita-
tions on remedies, from written contracts.18 3  Courts have used
18' For an account of this assault upon the citadel of the classical theory, see Holmes,
supra note 9 at 384-95, 419-35. The two concepts are equitable in origin. During the reign
of Edward III (1327-1337), the English Court of Chancery appeared as a distinct court
with prerogative jurisdiction to grant relief which common-law courts would not or could
not give. The Chancery Court previously had exercised extraordinary jurisdiction only by
permission of the King or the Select Council. See 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 34 (4th ed. 1918). But in 1349, Edward III by a general writ referred all
such matters as were "of Grace" to the Chancellor for adjudication. 1 G. SPENCE, THE
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 337 (1846). This general prerogative
of grace required the Chancellor to base his decision on principles of "Conscience, Good
Faith, Honesty and Equity." Id. at 407-08. If a party to a contract committed any uncon-
scientious act or breach of good faith, then the Chancellor would grant relief "under the
head of conscience" to the other party. Id. at 413.
18" The Uniform Commercial Code defines "good faith" in two sections. The general
definition, applicable to all articles, appears in U.C.C. § 1-201(19): "'Good faith' means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." The Article Two definition for
sales is in § 2-103(b): "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." The basic
statutory good-faith requirement for all U.C.C. transactions is in § 1-203: "Every contract
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment."'The importance of good faith is underscored by the fact that it is expressly men-
tioned in some 50 out of the 400 sections of the Code.
The Restatement provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent. Drafts No. 1-7 1973). The doctrine of unconscionability is en-
shrined in U.C.C. § 2-302 and in § 234 of the Restatement. The doctrine allows a court to
refuse to enforce the entire contract, to excise a paragraph or to limit unconscionable
provisions so as to avoid unconscionable results. See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 2.
The absorption of unconscionability by modern commercial law is carefully
documented in Leff, Unconsdonabilitv and the Code -The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 528-41 (1967). For a similar account regarding good faith, see Newman, The
Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 553
(1969); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
"8 See U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
113 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Other
examples include waiver of defense clauses (see, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967)), add-on, dragnet, and cross-collateral clauses (see, e.g., Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), noted in 79 HARV. L. REV. 1299
(1966)), cognovit (confession of judgment) clauses (see, e.g., Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374
Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953)), and indemnity and exculpatory clauses (see, e.g., Weaver v.
American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971)).
372
1980] COMMERCIAL GOOD FAITH
the principle of conscionability (although not always by name) in
the insurance context for many decades to prevent contractual
overreaching by insurers. 18 4  In his study of insurance, Professor
Robert Keeton identified the equitable principle at work: An in-
surer will not be permitted an unconscionable advantage in an
insurance transaction as a result of policy terms even though the
insured has manifested fully informed consent.1 85
Courts use the good faith principle to imply contractual terms
according to the dictates of fair dealing and public policy. Implied
warranties of merchantability1 86 and habitability, 8 7 are examples.
As Professor Farnsworth observes, the importance of the concept
of good faith is in "implying [contract] terms" to assure perform-
ance. 188  Good faith also supports implied duties: for example,
the duties to cooperate in performance 89 and to mitigate dam-
184 See generally Holmes, supra note 100.
185 R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 341-69 (1971). For a study of the interre-
lationship of classical notions of mutual assent and the unconscionability principle, see
Holmes, Interpreting an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the Evidentiary Condition, 12
GA. L. REv. 783 (1978).
186 U.C.C. § 2-314.
187 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. App. 1970); Ingalls v.
Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970). There are numerous other examples. Gap-filling of missing terms, which changes
the classical contract rules of presentation is one. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REv. 589 (1974). Section 2-204(3) of the U.C.C. authorizes gap-
filling when material terms are left open. Terms like particulars of performance (U.C.C. §
2-311) or time for performance (U.C.C. § 2-309(1)), can be supplied by the court.
The doctrine of constructive conditions is another example. The idea that good-faith
performance is secured through the recognition of constructive conditions was first
explained in Corbin's classic article, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739
(1919). For an update, see Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33
(1970). Other examples include: (1) good faith denial of an architect's certificate (3 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 651 (1960)); (2) the implication of a good faith requirement in out-
put and requirements contracts to avoid illusory consideration (see U.C.C. § 2-306(1)); (3)
good faith limitations on cancellation powers (see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J.
402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973) (court implies a requirement that cancellation be "for cause" into
the unilateral right of oil company to cancel dealer's lease); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (court requires good faith firing in at will employ-
ment)); (4) the requirement that modification be in good faith (U.C.C. § 2-209 and Com-
ment 2)); (5) the rule that a beneficiary's right vests if he relies in good faith (see, e.g.,
Copeland v. Beard, 217 Ala. 216, 115 So. 389 (1928)); (6) an agreement to forbear from
suit on an invalid claim is not consideration unless made in good faith (RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 76B (Tent. Draft No. 2 1965)); and (7) the rule that the holder of a
right of first refusal cannot impair the ability to sell (see, e.g., Wellmore Builders, Inc. v.
Wannier, 49 N.J. Super. 456, 140 A.2d 422 (App. Div. 1958)).
,' Farnsworth, supra note 164, at 670.
,19 A fitting illustration of a duty implied from the principle of good faith and fair
dealing is the duty to cooperate to cause a material condition to occur. See 3 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 571 (1960).
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ages. 190 Thus, the equitable good-faith principle authorizes
courts to impose terms and duties in accord with the parties' ex-
pectations and to grant equitable damages for nonperformance.
The bench and bar must recognize this power.191 Too often
departures from the principle of freedom of contract have been
masked by courts that purport to construe the parties' agree-
ment.1 92  Fortunately, as equitable duties and implied terms have
begun to emasculate contractual powers, courts have started to ar-
190 For a discussion of this duty implied from the good-faith principle, see D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 188-91 (1973); F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note
10, at 976-89. Other examples include the duty to attempt to perform as by making
reasonable efforts to secure a loan (see, e.g., Lach v. Cahill, 138 Conn. 418, 85 A.2d 481
(1951)), or to sell another's product in an exclusive dealing contract (see, e.g., Underhill v.
Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 143 N.E. 773 (1924); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y.
88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917); U.C.C. § 2.306(2)). Courts have also implied a duty to give
reasonable notice of termination. See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
150 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1945). Cf U.C.C.C. § 2-306(3). See generally Gellhorn, Limitations
on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465. Duties to repre-
sent an insured by appealing an adverse judgment (see, e.g., Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914)) and to take action to rid a cloud on title are also
common (see, e.g., Sitlington v. Fulton, 281 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1960)). The implied duty
not to evade the spirit of the deal is a catchall. See, e.g., Mortgage Corp. v. Manhattan
Savings Bank, 71 N.J. Super. 489, 177 A.2d 326 (Law Div. 1962) (every contract has im-
plied covenant not to render valueless the rights conferred by that contract). It covers the
requirements contract cases where a buyer pretends not to have requirements or suddenly
expands requirements. See, e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir.
1966); Massachusetts Gas & Elec. Light Supply Corp. v. V-M Corp., 387 F.2d 605 (1st Cir.
1967). Another category of cases follow a scenario according to which A and B agree to
exploit some assets for long term mutual profit. B discovers that circumstances will permit
him to increase his profits at A's expense. Such conduct evades the spirit of the deal and
injuries A's right to receive his expectation. The percentage-leasing cases are illustrative.
See, e.g., Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248 (1964).
191 This recognition has not come easily. Justice Holmes expressed difficulty in under-
standing why the law imposes duties in some instances and not others. Holmes, supra note
10, at 465-66. Professor Leon Green also seems confused: "How does the stating of the
problem in terms of duties enable a judge to pass judgment? Where shall he find the
source of duties?" Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,
1024 11928).
192 In his early study of insurance cases, Professor Kessler brilliantly analyzes this proc-
ess of using covert tactics to write out substantially oppressive terms and write in good-
faith principles:
[Clourts have made great efforts to protect the weaker contracting party and
still keep 'the elementary rules' of the law of contracts intact. As a result, our
common law of standardized contracts is highly contradictory and confusing,
and the potentialities inherent in the common law system for coping with con-
tracts of adhesion have not been fully developed.
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ticulate the real bases for their decisions. 193  Even Samuel Willis-
ton, the grand designer of classical contract theory, accepted the
good-faith principle.
The underlying principle is that there is an implied covenant
that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every contract there
exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'9 4
In summary, when "extra-contract" damages are awarded for
nonperformance of a contract, the wrong that occurred was
equitable. Recognition of the equitable nature of this duty precipi-
tates a rethinking of the character of this theory. It is an error to
start with the remedy-mental suffering, attorney's fees, or puni-
tive damages - and then infer that defendant committed a tort
wrong. No doubt much of the confusion is caused by the diverse
forms of relief available. When an ex delicto award is made, for
instance, it is natural to conclude that it was tort-based. It is the
breach of a duty that leads to an appropriate remedy and one
should start with the duty rather than the remedy. In every con-
tract there is an implied covenant that one will not harm another's
contractual expectation by bad-faith nonperformance. The equit-
able principle of good faith and fair dealing supplies the law with
a standard to measure conduct in contract nonperformance. If
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUt. L. REv.
629, 633 (1943). Professor Murray also notes the problem and suggests the solution:
[I]t is to be observed that courts, even today, frequently hesitate to admit that
conditions are being read into the contract, when that is in fact what is being
done. The tendency is to conceal the true nature of the process under the cloak
of a spurious interpretation.... As an original matter it would probably have
been wiser had the courts, instead of dealing with the problem through the
medium of so-called implied condition, frankly admitted that we have here a
situation calling for an equitable adjustment of the rights and duties of the
parties under circumstances not provided by them.
J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 305-06 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
193 Thus during the last generation, the courts of New Jersey have engaged in the
explicit "development of those principles of equity, fair dealing, good faith ...
which breathed new life-giving honesty into the bare contractual relationship."
In a number of cases, the naked terms of a contract, however explicit, were
held not to constitute the final balance of decision. New Jersey Courts instead
judged contractual provisions against the demands of fair dealing and public
policy ... [and] implied terms ... [and] created an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing [in contracts].
Schultze v. Chevron Oil Co., 579 F.2d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). For a
discussion of the process of leavening contractual rights with equitable duties in the insur-
ance context, see Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495
(1974).
194 5 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961) (Emphasis
added).
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nonperformance is in good faith, courts award traditional contract
remedies. If nonperformance is in bad faith or is accompanied by
outrageous, malicious or fraudulent conduct, then they may grant
tort-like damages. Notwithstanding the nature of the damage
award, the relief is based on an independent substantive theory
springing from equity.
Attempts to name this theory of liability more precisely than
equity or "good faith" have contributed to misunderstanding.
Most suggested labels, at least in the first-party insurance area,
either are not adequately descriptive or retain inapt references to
traditional legal pigeonholes; examples are "tort of bad faith," 95
"tort of outrage," 196 "tortious breach of contract," 197 "tortious in-
terference with a protected property interest," 198 "bad faith
breach," 199 "Gruenberg-ian tort,"200 and "insurer's mistaken judg-
ment."201  "Bad faith wrong"202 may be the most accurate and
least deceptive. This buzzing confusion suggests an analogy to the
law of restitution. From the equitable principle of restitution for
unjust enrichment, courts have fashioned wide-ranging forms of
relief including constructive trust, replevin, ejectment, rescission,
and implied-in-law contract (quasi ex contractu). The word "restitu-
tion" was chosen by the authors of the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution over forty years ago to represent the commonality of
these diverse forms of relief.20 3  But, as Professor Seeburger ex-
plains, many in the legal profession do not see restitution as a dis-
tinct theory of relief but only as a means of describing alternate
remedies. 204
From the equitable principle of good faith and fair dealing in
contract performance and enforcement, courts have fashioned
various forms of relief to apply when the defendant fails to per-
195 Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 71 (1973).
"I Volz, The New Tort of Outrage, 36 ALA. LAW. 568 (1975).
1'7 Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 236, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 547, 552 (1972).
190 Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of the Intentional Infliction of Mental Dis-
tress: Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 39 INs. COUNSEL J. 335, 339 (1972).
"99 13 TULSA L.J. 606, 625 (1978).
"0 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 492, 503 (1974).
201 Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment -A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 775 (1976).
202 Summers, supra note 181, at 258.
203 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1937). The restaters were Professors A.
W. Scott and W. A. Seavey.
0'4 They see it [restitution] as only a remedy. It is used by them as no more than
alternative measure of damages in a conversion- case, as only an election to be
made in the event of a material breach of contract, or as a device for taking the
profit from errant fiduciaries. The plain fact is that Restitution is a substantive,
and independent, theory of liability.
Seeburger, Book Review, 40 U. PIr. L. REV. 121, 122 (1978).
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form in good faith. But unlike the word "restitution," good faith
or even good faith performance does not describe adequately the
basis for the award of extra-contract damages. Since the duty
originates in equity, pertains to contract performance, and upon
breach awards tort-like damages, an appropriate name for this
overlapping of traditional categories might be "conequitort." The
word "restitution" was invented to underscore its separate signifi-
cance. The focus that a name gives 20 5 encourages the legal profes-
sional to put a sharp analytical eye on the substantive law of res-
titution. The use of a novel name like conequitort might cause
this substantive, independent theory of liability to come into
clearer focus for judicial development.
2. The Standard of Conduct
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in com-
mercial contracts reflects the ethical tenor of our society and re-
quires that the contractual powers society sanctions be reasonably
exercised. The key to understanding good faith lies in the word
"reasonableness." The requirement of good faith invokes notions
of unselfishness and impartiality -an insurer must weigh the
competing interests and give the insured's interest at least as
much weight as his own. "Bad faith" refers to unreasonable con-
duct wrongfully depriving the other party of the benefits of the
agreement. 20 6  When an insurer unreasonably denies an insured
the benefit of having a stated sum of money available upon the
occurrence of a contingent risk, a breach of the good-faith duty
occurs. The insurer's conduct is unreasonable when it shows a de-
liberate preference for its interests over those of the insured. The
good-faith standard requires a party to seek a fair mean, to try to
strike an equitable balance when a conflict of interests ap-
pears.2 0 7  This standard is at odds with the traditional conception
of contracting parties as atomistic entities, bound only by arid
205 1 am familiar with Dean Prosser's famous statement that a tort does not need a
name. W. PROSSER, supra note 235, at 3. But again, this new "extra-contract" claim is not a
tort, and Prosser just may have been wrong anyway.
206 See note 135 and accompanying text supra. The ultimate duty arising from the cove-
nant of good faith is "that neither party will do anything to deprive the other of the benefits
oJ the agreement." Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3rd 1, 27, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653,
670 (1978) (emphasis in original).
207 To act in good faith is to exercise one's formal entitlements in the spirit of
solidarity. The good faith standard requires one to find in each case the mean
between the principle that one party may disregard the interests of the other in
the exercise of his own rights and the counterprinciples that he must treat
those interests exactly as if they were his own.
R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY 210 (1976).
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formalities which reflect the prevailing individualistic attitudes of
the nineteenth century.
Under the good faith standard, a carrier need only act hon-
estly upon reasonable grounds in denying or delaying payment. A
good-faith refusal to pay means that the insurer has reasonable
grounds or probable cause in law or in fact to reject the claim. 20 8
At first glance, this reasonableness standard looks like the ordi-
nary tort standard. It is not. Since the good-faith duty originates
in equity, a contracting party is held to a higher standard of con-
duct than the ordinary negligence standard: The carrier must ac-
cord the insured's interests consideration at least equal to that he
gives his own.
Good faith and negligence are similar in that both ordinarily
pose questions of fact to be decided by the jury. The standard for
judging conduct, however, differs. Negligence is based upon an
objective standard of due care; good faith conduct is irrelevant to
the issue of negligence. If a defendant fails to comply with the
objective negligence standard, then the fact that he was acting in
good faith will not reduce his responsibility for the consequences
of his negligent act. Well-intentioned bungling is actionable under
the negligence standard. Although good faith is irrelevant to the
negligence issue, the converse is not necessarily true; negligent
conduct can be used as circumstantial evidence of bad faith. In
determining whether an insured had a reasonable basis to deny
benefits, negligent handling or processing of the claim is relevant.
For example, a court might investigate whether the insurer un-
dertook a proper investigation of the claim before it denied ben-
efits, and, if so, whether it subjected the results of the investiga-
tion to fair, professional review and evaluation. 9 Only negligent
acts that permit an inference of disregard for the insured's in-
terests bear on bad faith. Notwithstanding the interrelationship of
the two concepts, the good-faith standard has a sphere of author-
ity quite distinct from the negligence standard; under Silberg's in-
quiry into both the objective and subjective reasonableness of the
208 An insurance company which fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured by refusing unreasonably to pay the insured for a valid claim covered by
the policy is subject to liability for all damages proximately resulting from such
conduct.
California Jury Instructions, CAL. CIv. CODE § 12.92 (1977) (emphasis added).
20 Comment, Extra-Contractual Damages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 46 CiN. L. REv. 170,
185 (1977). Recently, the California Supreme Court held that failure to investigate prop-
erly is a breach of the good-faith covenant as a matter of law. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
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insurer's conduct, 210 it holds him accountable to a higher standard
than ordinary negligence.
Some commentators fear that there is a movement away from
this good-faith standard toward strict liability.2 11  Much of the
concern centers around a 1975 first-party insurance opinion
which mixed first-party and third-party cases and held that "in-
surance companies that erroneously withhold payments from their
insureds, and deprive them of the security they bargained for,
must be held to account for the consequences of their con-
duct." 212  If courts replace bad faith or wrongful refusal with er-
roneous refusal, strict liability will result. A year later, in Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha, 13 the California Court of Appeals was more
explicit: "When an insurer decides to withhold payment on a pol-
icy of insurance, it proceeds at its own risk."214  Surprisingly, the
long-awaited California Supreme Court opinion in Egan failed to
clarify the standard. 215  The law remains unclear.
210 See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
21 See, e.g., Kircher, supra note 201, at 779.
212 McDowell v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136, 141 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (em-
phasis added). In Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 538 P.2d 744 (1975), a third-party excess case, Judge Tobriner held
that if a policy-limits demand is made and reasonable time for consideration is given, and
the insurer rejects the demand, then it does so at its peril. The insurer was held liable
although it had promptly filed a declaratory action in an attempt to resolve the coverage
dispute. Although the court held that it was not deciding whether an insurer is strictly
liable for failure to accept the demand, it did just that:
[An insurer who fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy
limits because it believes the policy does not provide coverage assumes the risk
that it will be held liable for all damages resulting from such refusal...
Id. at 12, 538 P.2d at 746, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (emphasis added). The court, citing
Communale, held that assumption of the risk occurred even if the insurer had a good faith
belief that the policy did not provide coverage. It stated that:
an insurer's "good faith," though erroneous, belief in noncoverage affords no
defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a reasonable
settlement offer.
Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (footnote omitted). McDowell applied
Johansen's strict liability standard to a first-party case. 404 F. Supp. at 140-41.
213 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (Cal. App. 1976), hearing granted, Cal Sup. Ct., No. 30747 (Mar. 9,
1977) (opinion withdrawn from official publication).
214 Id. at 909.
215 The California Court of Appeals directed a verdict on the issue of breach of the
good faith covenant based on Mutual's failure to investigate plaintiff's claim properly. On
appeal, Mutual argued that the ruling subjected it to strict liability in tort and that the
covenant could be breached only by a wrongful denial when the insurer knew it had no
reasonable basis for its refusal to pay. The California Supreme Court disagreed, and in
these pithy words explained:
Although we recognize that distinguishing fraudulent from legitimate claims
may occasionally be difficult for insurers, especially in the context of disability
policies, an insurer cannot reasonably and in good faith deny payments to its
insured without thoroughly investigating the foundation for its denial.
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Despite these cases, it is doubtful that a strict liability standard
will ever generally apply in the first-party context. Several factors
suggest that the good faith standard will continue to govern
first-party cases. First, the duty of good faith conduct provides
adequate protection for all competing interests. An insurer who
makes an honest mistake in failing to pay should not be held
strictly liable for all the insured's consequential losses. Insurance
companies should be encouraged to contest what they honestly
consider to be illegitimate claims and avoid dissipating their re-
serves. The only safe course of action under a withhold-at-your-
own-risk rule is to "[p]ay all claims and investigate afterwards, as-
suming, of course, payment doesn't waive that right." 216  Second,
although strict liability is gaining some momentum in third-party
cases, 217 the policy underpinning the insurer's duty to use reason-
able care in settling third-party claims is inapposite to first-party
claims. When a third-party insurer denies coverage and refuses to
defend, it may be appropriate to impose the risk of an erroneous
decision on it. The coverage denial implicitly rejects all future set-
tlement offers exposing the insured to a potentially disastrous ex-
cess judgment. Moreover, the company stands in a special rela-
tionship to the insured; it has agreed to undertake his defense,
and he has placed himself in its hands. Thus, most courts which
have considered the issue hold that a distinction between first and
third-party cases is warranted 218 and that an insurer who denies a
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979). Since Mutual failed to investigate properly by having the disabled insured
examined by a doctor of its choice or by consulting with the insured's doctors and surgeon,
the court held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the good-faith covenant
had been breached.
Thus, the most that can be deduced on the strict liability issue in California is the
following: An insurer's failure to pay a first-party benefit is a breach of the convenant of
good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law in at least two instances: (1) when the insurer
fails to investigate properly the insured's claim (see id.); (2) when the insurer drafts an
ambiguous policy provision and then interprets it against the insured in denying payment.
See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 982, 79 Cal. Rptr. 326
(1969); notes 149-52 and accompanying text supra. At least one writer concludes that a
holding on the issue of good faith as a matter of law "extends the doctrine of strict liability
in tort to insurance policies." J. MCCARTHY, supra note 36, at 68. To be charitable, that
conclusion is somewhat infelicitous.
216 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 592, 510 P.2d 1032, 1049, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 497 (1973) (dissenting opinion, Roth, J.).
217 See, e.g., Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706
(1976). See also Comment, In California Excess Liability Cases, Does "Bad Faith" in Law Equal
Strict Liability in Practice?, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 115, 121 (1977).
218 See, e.g., Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576,
580-81 (1978). See also Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir.
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first-party claim based on an honest but mistaken belief of non-
coverage ought to be protected.219 The California Court of Ap-
peals in the recent case of Austero v. National Casualty Co. 22 ° settled
on the rule that will probably prevail in first-party cases. The
court looked to Silberg and Gruenberg and held unequivocally "that
the ultimate test of liability in the first party cases is whether the
refusal to pay policy benefits was unreasonable." 221
In summary, the good-faith standard is not tort-based. Al-
though bad faith may involve negligence or negligence may be
indicative of bad faith, negligence alone is insufficient to render
an insurer liable for extra-contract damages. Since the carrier
must give at least equal weight to the insured's interest, the in-
surer is held to a higher standard than that of the tort standard of
due care. Second, the equal-consideration test requires a two-tier
inquiry. The first is objective: Was there a reasonable basis in law
or fact for denying benefits? The second is subjective: Did the
insurer deny benefits while it knew or should have known there
was no reasonable basis for doing so? Such knowledge can be im-
plied as a matter of law in proper cases. Third, with the wide-
spread use of the good-faith standard which measures the reason-
ableness of the insurer's conduct, strict liability is unlikely to get a
grip on this area of the law. Finally, intent to harm is not a requis-
ite of bad faith conduct. Proof of fraud, malice, oppression or
outrageous conduct is not required. The standard of conduct for
determining whether an insurer has breached the convenant of
good faith, therefore, differs from the standard for judging
whether that same party is liable for punitive damages.
III
FRAUDULENT OR OPPRESSIVE BREACH OF CONTRACT
Courts limit recovery for simple breach of contract to classical
contract remedies, and for bad-faith breach of an equitable cov-
1953); Merrin Jewelry v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 436-37, 111 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1959).
219 See, e.g., Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hospital Care, 29 Ill. App.3d 339, 330
N.E.2d 540 (1975) rev'd on other grounds, 64 I11. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976).
220 Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978), discussed
in 19 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FOR THE DEFENSE 215 (1978).
221 Id. at 32, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The petition for rehearing in Austero was not only
denied but the court resolutely reaffirmed the original opinion, flatly rejecting the deny-
at-your-own-risk rule as precedent for first-party cases. The California Supreme Court has
sanctioned this point of view. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal.3d 910, 582 P.2d
980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
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enant to extra-contract damages, such as attorney's fees, 2 2 litiga-
tion costs, 223 collateral economic losses,"' and mental suffer-
ing.22 5  They focus on the nature of the insurer's conduct-
whether the insurer was unreasonably serving its own interests, or
was fairly but incorrectly withholding payments-and draw upon
contract or tort for damages that fit the crime. This focus, how-
ever, has led some courts to recognize yet a third independent
category: a breach where the insurer intended to harm its in-
sured. In Beck v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 226 the
court cyrstallized this distinction:
[P]roof of a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
does not establish that the defendant acted with the requisite
intent to injure the plaintiff. Thus it does not follow that, be-
cause State Farm took an unreasonable [bad faith] position on
the validity of a defense to coverage under Beck's policy, State
Farm acted with intent to harm Beck.227
If State Farm intentionally harmed its insured, he could recover
punitive damages. Since courts infer intention from objective con-
duct, they must revert to evaluating the nature of the insurer's
conduct. One can appreciate this process only through case-by-
case analysis.
The cases show gradations in the character of the conduct
surrounding the breach. Disability and health insurers sometimes
engage in malicious and outrageous conduct just to avoid legiti-
222 Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. 44 Cal. App.3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1975);
Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E. 2d 919 (1970).
223 Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1972); Escambia Treat-
ing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976); McDowell v. Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (D.C. Cal. 1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9
Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Christian v. American Home Assur.
Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
224 Consequential damages have been allowed where the insurer's conduct caused busi-
ness or credit losses as well as loss of homes through mortgage foreclosures. See, e.g., Al-
liance Ins. Co. v. Alper-Salvage Co., 19 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1927) (Tennessee law); Campbell
v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1974); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peter-
son, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).
225 Many of the courts which have recognized the right to recover consequential dam-
ages from an insurer for bad-faith failure or delay in. making payments under a policy
have included the mental suffering caused by the failure or delay within the damages
recoverable. See note 96 supra.
226 54 Cal. App.3d 347, 126 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1976).
227 Id. at 355-56, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (citing Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d
452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974)).
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mate claims.228  They intentionally leave insureds and their
families destitute, 229 fraudulently attempt to induce insureds into
waiving their policy rights, 230 and harass them by requiring bur-
densome, unnecessary medical examinations 231 and by slandering
them.232 Fire insurers allegedly initiate unfounded prosecutions
for arson and fraud,233 force insureds into expensive and time-
consuming examinations solely to delay payment, 234 and propel
insureds into bankruptcy by delaying desperately needed policy
benefits.235  A life insurance company may invent a nonexistent
defense to force an unfair settlement on a poor widow.236 In
short, insurers do use fraudulent, oppressive, and abusive tactics
to coerce insureds into unfair settlements. One commentator
warned that "unless prevented by the courts, it is to the interest of
a disability insurer to engage in protracted and unwarranted liti-
gation creating undue stress which may well precipitate the in-
sured's death." 2 37
What do courts do about such tactics? Many duck the issue by
keeping their heads buried in the firm but shallow soil of classical
contract law. These courts proclaim that the matter is contract
and punitive damages are not awarded for breach of contract re-
gardless of how malicious, oppressive or fraudulent the
breach. 238  Even while resting on this ghostly conceptual illusion
22. See, e.g., Felder v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575 (D.S.C. 1966); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); State ex rel.
Larson v. District Ct. of 8th Jud. Dist., 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
229 See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal.3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974).
230 Cases listed in Note, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10
S.C.L.Q. 444, 468 (1958). See also cases cited in note 228 supra.
231 See, e.g., Haas v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 334, 41 N.E.2d 263,
265 (1941).
232 See, e.g., Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 33 (Fla. App. 1970).
233 See, e.g., Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal. Rptr.
581 (1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 571, 510 P.2d 1032, 1035, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1973).
234 See, e.g., Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479,
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Ind. Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582
(1920).
235 See, e.g., Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal.2d 822, 827, 442 P.2d 377,
379, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1968) (en banc).
236 See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
237 16 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 23 § 8881, at 636 (citation omitted).
238 In Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922), the court held that
even where the petitioner averred that the defendant breached the contract "unlawfully,
forcibly, willfully, wantonly, [and] maliciously," the action ex contractu did not become an
action ex delicto. Id. at 376-77, 136 N.E. at 146.
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of fixed islands of tort and contract, some courts are troubled by
denying all extra-contract recovery. When the voice of conscience
gets the better of them, they assert that extra damages may be
recovered if the claim is founded on an imposed duty rather than
upon a contractual duty.2 39 Ignoring imposed duties from
equity, these courts turn solely to the imposed duty of tort. Their
final position is aptly summed up by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts: "Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of
contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort
for which punitive damages are recoverable."2 4 0  In first-party
disputes, many courts have accordingly granted punitive damages
when the breach of the policy was accompanied by an indepen-
dent tort.241
These cases fall into two categories based on when the tort-
wrong occurred: at the sales (contract formation) stage or at the
claims presentation and processing stage. At the sales stage, the
sales agent may intentionally misrepresent the scope of cover-
age 24 2 or the carrier may issue the policy with no intention of
ever performing the contractual obligations fairly.243 These cases
require proof of what might be called "promissory fraud." The
239 See cases collected in 1 C.J.S., ACTIONS § 47 (1936).
240 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 369 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979).
241 Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976);
Helton v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Mont. 1975) (violation of statute);
Cassady v. United Ins. Co. of America, 370 F. Supp. 388 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Asher v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Short v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 307
F. Supp. 768 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Woodal, 326 So. 2d 726
(Ala. 1976); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974); MacDonald v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 Ill. App. 3d 369, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975);
Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975); Newton v. Standard Fire
Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111-12, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976); Christian v. American Home
Assur. Corp., 577 P.2d 299 (Okla. 1977); Drake v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d
977, 236 N.W.2d 204 (1974).
South Carolina has its own special rules. Before one is entitled to punitive damages, he
must prove not only that the breach of contract was effected with fraudulent intent but
also that the breach was accompanied by a fraudulent act. For a discussion of the South
Carolina cases see Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illu-
sion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 231-36 (1977).
242 See, e.g., Sharp v. Automobile Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964);
Craver v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 37 Ohio App. 2d 100, 307 N.E. 2d 265 (1973).
243 See, e.g., Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App.2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1968); Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1976); International Security Life Ins. Co., 475 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd in
part, 496 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973).
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requisite pre-contract intent to defraud may be proven by infer-
ence from the insurer's subsequent post-claim conduct.244 At the
claims presentation and processing stage, the wrong that occurs is
the use of oppressive or fraudulent conduct (or some combination
of both) to extort an unfair settlement. The wrong may be pure
economic coercion accomplished by delaying tactics which play on
the insured's poor financial condition or fraudulent coercion such
as pretended defenses, false accusations, mental harassment and
other tricks. One can extract from these cases a standard for
awarding punitive damages based on notions of fraud and op-
pression. The standard is intentional, aggravated misconduct
which consists of some form of fraud or oppression or both.
Therefore, the rule for recovering punitive damages requires
proof of: Breach of contract + Independent tort + Intentional,
aggravated misconduct.
The independent torts that are typically relevant in this area
are described above. 45 They consist of either fraud, intentional
infliction of mental distress, intentional interference with a pro-
tected property interest, or the tort of bad faith. To speak of a
tort of bad faith, however, is to indulge in a legal fiction 246 so that
courts may-award punitive damages.
Two other theories that may be more analytically sound can
support these punitive awards. The first pays lip service to the
independent tort requirement by asserting that the breach of the
contract itself is a tortious act for which punitive damages are re-
coverable.247 An Ohio court concluded, for example, "that the
actions of the defendant were such as to be a breach of contract
amounting to a wilful, wanton and malicious tort. .. 248 Perhaps
244 See Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1976); notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra.
245 See notes 106-56 and accompanying text supra.
246 Legal fictions are subject to many meanings. See L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967).
Their use incurred the wrath of Bentham: "Fiction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is
to trade.... The most pernicious and basest sort lying. It affords presumptive and conclu-
sive evidence of moral turpitude. Id. at 3.
247 At least three jurisdictions adopt this approach. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381 (1974), rnodified on other grounds, 264 Ind. 599,
349 N.E.2d 173 (1976); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d
919 (C.P. 1970); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974) Cf.
Helton v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 1322 (D. Mont. 1975) (punitive damages
allowed when breach of the insurance policy is also violation of insurance code).
248 Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 46, 273 N.E.2d 919, 921 (C.P.
1970).
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the most important example of this school of thought is the In-
diana case of Vernon Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp.24 9
The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the lines between tort
and contract are often so blurred that any effort to segregate tor-
tious activity accompanying the breach from the breach itself is
futile. Moreover, the court found the reasons 250 for the indepen-
dent tort requirement insubstantial, especially when serious harm
occurs from tortious activity that cannot be conveniently
pigeonholed as an existing tort. Rather than recognizing the tort
of bad faith, the court held that when conduct with tortious over-
tones mingles with the contract breach, an independent tort is not
a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages. 25 1  The
breach per se is tortious in nature.
The Indiana Court of Appeals' opinion in Vernon, which the
Indiana Supreme Court upheld, is even more direct. Citing cases
that awarded punitive damages but in which no contracts were
at issue, 252 the appeals court held that "the evidence was sufficient
to allow the jury to find that the insurer's conduct amounted to
heedless disregard of the consequences, malice, gross fraud or
oppressive conduct." 25 3  In effect, the court indicated that puni-
tive damages should be awarded in contract actions according to
the standard applied in tort. Vernon is not an isolated opinion;
courts are awarding punitive damages in contract actions outside
the insurance context on similar grounds.25 4  But punitive dam-
ages are not recoverable for every contract breach. As in tort ac-
249 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976).
250 According to the court, the functions of the independent tort requirement are
twofold:
First, it maintains the symmetry of the general rule of not allowing punitive
damages in contract actions, because the punitive damages are awarded for the
tort, not the contract. Secondly, the independent tort requirement facilitates ju-
dicial review of the evidence by limiting the scope of review to a search for the
elements of the tort.
Id. at 608, 349 N.E.2d at 180 (emphasis in original).
251 Id. at 609, 349 N.E.2d at 181.
252 161 Ind. App. 413, 417, 316 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1974).
253 Id.
254 See, e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I.
1975); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 163 Ind. App. 308, 323 N.E.2d 270 (1975); Eakman v.
Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). See also Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501
P.2d 368 (1972).
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tions, punitive damages should be recoverable only upon proof of
aggravated or reckless conduct. 255 Thus, the first alternative
analysis is to declare that the breach of the contract itself is tor-
tious in nature and may allow for punitive damages. The formula
for this approach would require a plaintiff to prove: Breach of
contract + intentional, aggravated misconduct.
The second alternative approach also eliminates the require-
ment of proving an independent tort. Recognizing that a plain-
tiff's complaint is often an inextricable mix of contract and tort
elements, these courts do not categorize cases of oppressive or
fraudulent breach as either.25 6 They recognize that analysis
should not be driven underground, that courts ought to explain
the real bases for decisionmaking, and that covert manipulation of
rules to achieve a just result is a judicial prevarication.2 57  Boise
Dodge, Inc. v. Clark258 is an example. There the Idaho Supreme
Court acknowledged not only that tort is difficult to distinguish
from contract, but also that such a distinction is unnecessary to
the imposition of punitive damages. When plaintiff's "new" au-
tomobile turned out to be second-hand, he sued for breach of
contract and received an award of punitive damages. Rather than
struggling with an obdurate conceptual illusion, the court struck
to the heart of the issue:
In any event, from the legal point of view of the imposition of
punitive damages in this case, it does not matter whether re-
spondent's counterclaim technically sounded in contract or
tort. The rule ... is that punitive damages may be assessed in
contract actions where there is fraud, malice, oppression or
other sufficient reason for doing so. This rule recognizes that
in certain cases elements of tort, for which punitive damages
have always been recoverable upon a showing of malice, may be
255 W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 9-10.
256 For a thoughtful development and analysis of these cases, see Sullivan, supra note 2,
at 236-40.
257 The distinctions between tort and contract are so protean and opaque that oftentimes
decisions using these distinctions are difficult to reconcile. Compare Associated Heavy Equip.
Schools, Inc. v. Masiello, 219 So.2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) with Henry Morrison
Flager Museum v. Lee, 268 So.2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Compare Scheps v. Giles,
222 S.W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) with Orgain v. Butler, 478 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
258 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969).
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inextricably mixed with elements of contract, in which punitive
damages generally are not recoverable.259
The problem with such cases, however, is that they fail to give any
theoretical justification for their decision except to reject the tort-
contract distinction as meaningless. The opinions, however, bristle
with notions of good faith and fair dealing. Arguably, their justifi-
cation lies in a conscious recognition that when an aggravated
breach of the equitable covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
contract performance occurs, punitive damages are authorized.
This approach also eliminates the requirement of an independent
tort and necessitates proof of: Breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing + intentional aggravated misconduct.
Whether courts will look beyond artificial distinctions between
tort and contract as well as requirements of independent torts for
the imposition of punitive damages rqmains to be seen. One can
safely say that the cutting edge of the law is already forged. But
the question of whether Vernon, Boise Dodge, Gruenberg, and Silberg
are harbingers of fundamental legal change or only isolated
examples of judicial candor is open to discussion.
CONCLUSION
Classical contract theory grew out of a single model of con-
tract formation: the bargained-for exchange. In its heyday, it
treated all contracts as if they conformed to that model. When
courts began to abandon this rigid assumption, Professor Gilmore
concluded that contract was dead. This report may have been
greatly exaggerated. Where the facts underlying a contract action
fit the traditional model-the simple breach situation-traditional
rules are appropriate and most courts continue to apply them.
Consensual theory survives where consensus is, in fact, the basis
of a contract.
A court may, however, conclude that a contract does not fit
the' traditional model and that the application of classical rules
would be unjust-the bad-faith and the oppressive breach situa-
tions. This study of first-party insurance contracts, which
exemplify the adhesive agreement, shows that judges are likely to
look beyond classical theory in such cases and fashion duties and
259 Id. at 907, 453 P.2d at 556. A more recent example involves a case in Fairfax County,
Virginia, where the court ordered Koons Ford, an auto dealer, to pay $25,000 in punitive
damages to an Arlington buyer who was told she was buying a "new" car. It was second-
hand. See Washington Post, May 19, 1979, at I, Col. 4. The case is on appeal.
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remedies necessary to do justice between the parties. This process
draws on the tort principle of fault to justify departing from tra-
ditional contract rules. Moreover, relief such as punitive and men-
tal distress damages is similar to that awarded in tort actions. But
the source of the theory that justifies extra-contract relief in a suit
for breach of contract is the law of equity, specifically the concepts
of conscience and good faith. Thus modern courts are synthesiz-
ing a new set of principles that supplement traditional contract
theory and confine it to its proper sphere of operation.
